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In The Supreme Court of
The State of Utah
LILLIAN JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
-vs.SINDA JACKSON, Executrix of the
Estate of JOHN JACKS~ON, deceased,

Defendant.

CIVIL
No. 7793

j

Brief of Respondent
STATEME·NT OF THE CASE
In view of the manner in which plaintiff has made her
statement of facts, we deem it necessary to make the following statement of facts in this case.
Lillian Jackson is the plaintiff in this action. Lillian
Jackson and John Jackson were married March 5, 1896. Seven children were born the issue of said marriage. On the
22nd day of April 1918, Lillian Jackson, John Jackson and
their children were, and for some considerable time prior
thereto had been, residents of and domi·ciled at Orland,
Glenn County, State of California. Their marriage was not
entirely happy and finally ended in a separation and a divorce.
On the 22nd day of April, 1918, at Orland, Glenn C'Ounty, State of California, Lillian Jackson and John Jackson en-
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tered into a written agreement, by the term·s of which they
divided up their property, made a full and complete settlement of all matters pertaining to and resulting from the
marriage contract and separated.
Said written agreement, so made, is attached to and
made a part of the plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit 2 (R.
page 8 to 14). Said agreement is set forth in full in the
Court's Findings of Fact (R. page 124 to 130) . Lillian
Jackson is the First Party and John Jackson is the 8econd
Party to said written agreement of April 22, 1918.
Lillian Jackson received as a result of s.aid agreement,
the sum of approximately $28,689.00, which sum was a little more than half of all property owned by John ·Jackson,
and in consideration thereof she agreed with John Jackson
in said written agreem~ent, among other things, as follows:

"
"WHEREAS, said first party contemplates
and is about to commence and prosecute an action
for divorce from and against said second party - - -

"
"WHERE~AS in anticipation of such proceedings of divorce being instituted by said first party
against said s.econd party, it has been deemed to
the interest of the aforesaid parties hereto and to
their children, that a property adjustment be at
this time made and entered into, whereby division of all of the properties, now owned and he'ld
by the parties hereto, be made to the entire satisfaction of the aforesaid parties and all persons concerned.

a

"NOW THE,RE FOR.E this ag:.:eem·ent made
and entered into by and between the parties afore1
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said, whereby for and in consideration of the covenants hereinafter contained, and the payment, conveyances, transfers, assignments, etc. hereinafter
set forth and specified, and all other considerations
hereinbefore had and received by and between the
parties aforesaid each to the other, does hereby
forever release the other from any future claim or
demand of either personal or property interests
held by the other, either legally or morally, growing out of and by reason of the aforesaid parties
hereto being or having been lawfully married.
"It being the intention of these presents and
the contract hereinby entered into and the considerations herein specified, that the said party of the
first part shall and will not make any further demand of property division or interests in any proceeding at law or otherwise, growing out of or by
reason of any action of divorce, said first party
may institute and prosecute. And the property division hereinafter specified is and shall be in full
settlement as complete adjustment of any claim or
right whatsoever, either legally or morally said
first party shall or may have upon said second party, or upon any of his property, as well as any claim
or right, legally or morally that the childred above
mentioned sh'all or may have therein save and excepting as hereinafter specified.
"As a further consideration herein, the said
party of the first part hereby promises and agrees
that she will, and hereby does assu.me and agree to
the sole and entire support hereafter of all of the
following mentioned minor children, namely: Jesse
Jackson, Fanny Jackson, Eldiva Jackson, Glenn
Jackson, and Josephine Jackson, and it is understood and agreed that the said party of the first
part shall have and be decreed the custody of the
aforesaid minor childred, and said first party
further agrees that she will properly provide for,
educate and care for all of said minor childred to
their majority ; and further, said party of the first
part hereby does and agrees to assume all legal
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and moral responsi~bility for the care and bringing
up of said minor childred.
"And said party of the second part hereby
agrees to assume and provide for the support, education, and care of John Jackson, Jr. until he shall
reach his age of maturity. And it is hereby expressedly understood and agreed that said party
of the second part shall at all times hereafter have
the custody of said John Jackson, Jr., and hereby
assumes all moral and legal responsibility for the
support, education, and care of said Minor child,
John Jackson, Jr.
The said party of the first part further agrees
that in event of the institution and prosecution
of an action for divorce from said second party, that she shall bring such action and prosecute
the same at her own and sole cost and expense,
and that in or under or by virtue of such action,
or any supplementary proceedings had therein,
she shall and will not ask or demand of or from
said second party any alimony or costs of action
or any support or demand for and in behalf of
any of the aforesaid minor childred to be in her
custody, and of which she has assumed the responsibility of the care and education of.
"It is hereby further understood and agreed
that the said party of the second part shall not
hereafter be responsible or liable for any debts or
obligations incurred by said first party or any of
the minor children in her behalf, from the date
hereof.
"The said party of the first part further
agrees not to make any demand or request for the
support, aid, or succor for herself or her minor
children, upon said second party, and said se~cond
party agrees to live separate and apart from said
first party and not in any way interfere with or
m'Olest her, or any of the children to be left in her
cus t 0 d y. " - - - - - - - -"
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5
Said written agreement was sworn to by Lillian Jackson and John Jackson on the 22nd day of April, 1918 at Orland, Glenn County, State of California, before H. W. Elichfeldt, a Notary Public in and for Glenn County, California.
John Jackson thereafter moved from Orland, California, to Moab, Utah. On the 20th day of December, 1919,
Lillian Jackson, in the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for Glenn County, obtained an interlocutory
decree of divorce from John Jackson (Plaintiff's Exhibit C)
and on the 22nd day of January, 1921, said interlocutory
decree of divorce was by final decree made final (Plaintiff's Exhibit D).
On the 7th day of September, 1920, at Moab, Utah,

Knox Patterson of the then law firm of Patterson and Constantine prepared Will for John Jackson (Plaintiff's Exhibit I) which is set forth in full in the Court's Findings (R.
page 138 to 140.) On September 8th, 1920, Patterson and
Constantine, by Geo. J. Constantine, mailed said Will by
letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit H) to Mrs. Belle Dennis at Orland, California. In said Will of September 7, 19-20, (Plaintiff's Exhibit I) John Jackson bequeathed his estate as follows:

a

"ARTICLE I. I give and bequeath to the seven children of my marriage with Lillian Jackson
as follows:
" (a) To my daughter, Mrs. Belle Dennis, now
of the age of 24 years the sum of Three Thousand
Two Hundred and Fifty ($3,250.00) Dollars; she
also to receive as beneficiary in my insurance pol- ·
icy with the Woodmen of the World to the extent
of Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars.
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" (b) To my son, Jesse Jackson, now of the
age of 22 years, the sum of Thirty Five Hundred
($3,500.00) Dollars.
" (c) To my son, John Jackson, now of the age
of 18 years, the sum of Thirty Five Hundred
($3500.00) Dollars.
" (d) To my daughter Fannie Jackson, now of
the age of 16 years, the sum of Three Thousand
Two Hundred and Fifty ($3,250.00) Dollars, she
also to receive as beneficiary in my insurance policy with the Woodmen of the World to the extent of
Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars.
" (e) To my daughter, Aldiva Jackson, now
of the age of 11 years, the sum of Three Thousand
Two Hundred and Fifty ($3,250.00) Dollars, she
also to receive as beneficiary in my insurance policy with the Woodmen of the World to the extent
of Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars.
" (f) To my son, Glen Jackson, now of the age
of 8 years, the sum of Thirty Five Hundred
($3,500.00) Dollars.
" (g) To my daughter, Josephine Jackson,
now of the age of 6 years, the sum of Three Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty ($3250.00) Dollars;
she also to receive as beneficiary in my insurance
with the Woodmen of the World to the extent of
Two Hundred and Fifty ($250.00) Dollars.
"IN THE EVENT any of my said daughters
shall die leaving surviving her no issue of her
body, then and in that event the share she would
have been entitled to shall be divided share and
share alike between my children surviving her.
IN THE· EVENT any of my said sons shall die
leaving surviving him neither wife nor children,
then and in that event the share he would have
been entitled to shall be divided share and share
alike between my children surviving him.
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".-\.RTICLE II. I hereby nominate, constitute
and appoint my daughter, !\'IRS. BELLE DENNIS
the sole executrix of this will and testament and
direct that she qualify and serve as such e~:ecu
trix without bonds or securities whatever, \Vhether
in the State of Utah, or elsewhere.
"ARTICLE !II. In order that no misunderstanding can arise I hereby state that at the time
of my divorce fron1 my former wife, Lillian Jackson, I fully settled \Yith her in every particular
and therefore the said Lillian Jackson shall in no
'\vay participate in, nor is she entitled to any interest whatsoever in my estate."
Said Will was witnessed by Attorney Knox Patterson
and Attorney Geo. J. Constantine, the two lawyers . constituting the law firm of Patterson and (jonstantine.
Attention is called to the fact that no provision whatsoever is made in the Will as to what disposition was to
be made of the remainder of the property of John Jackson,
other than as bequeathed to his children as aforesaid. There
is no residuary clause in said Will. Said Will, therefore, not ·
only leaves to said children $·3500.00 each, but leaves the
entire estate of John Jackson to said children.
On October 3, 1921, John Jackson married Binda Jackson. Sinda Jackson is the Executrix of the Last Will and
Testament of John Jackson, deceased, and the defendant
in this action. Six children were born of this marriage.
Their names and date of birth are as follows:
Jim Jackson, born December 14, 1924.
Opal Jackson Lemon, born April 29, 1928.
Ellesa Jackson Day, born February 20, 1932.
Alice Jackson, born December 24, 1935.
Joe J acksHn, born June 13, 1938, and
Jack Jackson, born January 24, 1941.
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All of said children are living and are residents of Utah.
Alice, Joe and Jack Jackson, three of said children, were
dependent upon John Jackson at the time of his death for
all of their support, education and maintenance and are
now completely dependent upon his estate for their support, education and maintenance.
On the 9th day of December, 1946, John Jackson made
his Last Will and Testament. Said Will is s.et forth in full
in the Court's Findings (R. pages 141 to 143). See also (R.
page 220). By said Will John Jackson devised and bequeathed one-half of all of his estate, real, personal and
mixed, to his wif.e, Sinda Jackson. In paragraph third of
said Will John Jackson provides for each of his children
by his first marriage as follows:
''Third.-! give, and bequeath to the six surviving children of my marriage with Lillian Jackson, namely: Belle Dennis, my daughter; Jesse
Jackson, my son; John Jackson, my son; Aldiva
Jackson, my daughter; Glen Jackson, my son and
Josephine Jackson, my daughter, the sum of one
thousand dollars ($1000.00) each."
All of the rest, residue and remainder of his estate he
gave, devised and bequeathed to the children of his marriage with Sinda Jackson, namely, Jim Jackson, Opal Jackson, Ellesa Jackson, Alice Jackson, Joe Jackson and Jack
Jackson, share and share alike. He appointed Sinda Jackson Executrix of his Last Will and Testament to serve without bond.
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In the seventh paragraph of his Will John Jackson
provides as follows :
"Seventh.-! hereby revoke all former wills
and testamentary dispositions by me at any time
made."
John Jackson died May 1, 1950, at Moab, Grand County, Utah. At the time of his death he was a resident of
Grand County, State of Utah. The Last Will and Testament of John Jackson, dated December 9, 1946, was duly
admitted to probate by the District Court of Grand County, State of Utah, on the 2nd day of June, 1950. On said
date Sinda Jackson was regularly appointed the Executrix
of said Last Will and Testament and she is now and ever
since the 2nd day of June, 1950, has been the duly appointed, qualified and acting Executrix of the Last Will and
Testament of John Jackson, deceased.
On September 1, 1950, Lillian Jackson, for the benefit
of herself and her children (the children of John Jackson,
deceased, and Lillian Jackson), namely: Belle Dennis, formerly Belle Jackson, Jeanne Raab, formerly Aldiva Jackson, Fanny Jackson, a dec-ease~ daughter, Joyce McKee, formerly Josephine Jackson, -Jesse Jackson, John Jackson and
Glen Jackson, filed a claim against Sinda Jackson as the
Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of John Jackson,
deceased, for the sum of $24,500.00. A copy of said claim
is attached to and made a part of plaintiff's complaint as
Exhibit I (R. page 5 to 7).
In said claim so presented to Sinda Jackson, as aforesaid, Lillian Jackson claims that at the time she made and
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entered into the written agreement of April 22, 1918, above
mentioned, at Orland, Glenn County, State of C:alifornia,
she:
"- - informed John Jackson, her husband, that
she would not accept said agreement on a basis of
a 50-50 split on their community property and at
the same time assume all responsibility for care,
control and education of said five (5) children.
Whereupon said John Jackson agreed to and with
the claimant in addition to the property so awarded
to her under said agreement of April 22, 1918, he
would make a will to all of his children bequeathing to them the sum of $3500.00 each."
Said alleged agreement to make a will and bequeath
$3500.00 to each of the plaintiff's children is an oral agreement claimed by plaintiff, Lillian Jackson, to have been
made contemporaneously with and at the time that the
written agreement of April 22, 1918, was made and entered
into. There is no writing whatever evidencing such agreement signed by John Jackson nor by his agent duly authorized. Said alleged oral agreem·ent of John Jackson to make
a will bequeathing $3500.00 to each of his children is in
direct contradiction to the written agreement of April 22,
1918, above mentioned, and is an attempt to add to, alter
and change the terms of said written agreement.
Said claim so presented by Lillian Jackson was rejected by the Executrix of the E'state of John Jackson, deceased,
and on the 30th day of November, 1950, Lillian Jackson
filed this action against Sinda Jackson, Executrix of the
Estate of John Jackson, deceased, to enforce the terms of
said alleged oral agr-eement to bequeath $3500.00 to each
of Plaintiff's children, instead of the $1000.00 bequeathed
to each of said children by the will of December 9, 1946.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
PLAINTIFF,S AMEND·ED COMPLAINT DOES NOT
STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE
OF ACION.
POINT II
THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED
AGAINST THE REAL PARTIES IN INTER.EST BY SECTIONS 102-9-4 and 102-9-9, U ..C.A. 1943, AND IS THE,REFORE BARRED AGAINST THE· PLAINTIFF WHO
CLAIMS TO SUE AS THE TRUSTEE OF AN EXPRESS
TRUST.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN E.XCLUDING THE
EVIDE·NCE O·F:
(A) THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF, LILLIAN
.JACKSON.
(B) THE TESTIMONY OF KNOX PATTE,RSON.
(C) THERE WERE NO 8E'PARATE WRITINGS
RELATING TO THE· SAME SUBJE CT WHICH
COULD BE CONSTRUED TOGETHE.R TO BE
ADMITTED.
1

POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT MISCONTRUE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT E·RR ON THE QUESTIO·N OF
PLAINTIFF'S PLEA OF ESTOPPEL.
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ARGUMENT
I

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT
STATE FACTS SUFFlCIE:NT TO CONSTITUTE
A CAUSE OF ACTION.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed February 15,
1951, (R. page 32).
The question of whether the Amended Complaint
stated a caus.e of action was argued to the Court at the
pre-trial sessions of the Court. The Trial Court in its PreTrial Order dated March 23, 1951, made the following
Order:
"BY THE· COURT: It is ordered on motion of
of Mr. Patterson that all references to quantum
meruit or the reasonable value of the service rendered by the plaintiff to the said John Jackson, deceased, be stricken and eliminated from this case."
(R. page 93) .
The Trial Court in its Pre-Trial Order dated April 3,
1951, ordered that one of the issues to be resolved by the
Court was:
"Defendant reserves his defense that the
Complaint does not state a cause of action." (R.
page 99).
In view of the stipulation of Counsel and the express
ruling of the court, we are unable to understand plaintiff's
statement found at page 49 of her brief which reads as
follows:
"There is no attack upon our pleading, no demurrer, no motion was filed in the cause and we
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distinctly raise the issue of estoppel, as
fraud."

v,~en

as

Plaintiff sets forth in full as part of her Complaint
the written agreement of April 22, 1918, (R. page 8). By
said written agreement plaintiff assumed all responsibility
for the care, control and education of her children. She
received under said written agreement as compensation
therefor, $28,689.00; said sum so received by her is admittedly half if not more than half, of all of John Jackson's
property. The Complaint in this action is based upon an
alleged oral agreement made at the same time and contemporaneously with the making of said written agreem·ent.
Plaintiff claims that John Jackson by said oral agreement,
agreed to "make a Will to his children bequeathing to them
$3500.00 each", in consideration of plaintiff assuming all
responsibility for the care, control and education of said
children. This alleged oral agreement is in direct conflict
with the plain and unequivocal terms of the written agreement of April 22, 1918.
In the face of said written agreement and the consideration therein set forth and fully received by the plaintiff for taking care of her children there certainly was no
consideration for the alleged oral agreement to make a
will and leave to the plaintiff's children $3500.00 each in
consideration of the plaintiff taking care of the children
because she had already agreed in writing to do that very
thing, and was paid in full for so doing. We conclude that
there was no consideration whatsoever for the alleged
oral agreement. The Amended Complaint for this reason,
therefor, does not state a cause of action.
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Defendant pleaded as a defense to the plaintiff's original Complaint the California Statute of Frauds, Section
1973, California Code of Civil Proceedure and Section 1624,
Civil Code of California, (R. pages 22 to 25). In view of the
pleaded defense of the California Statute of Frauds, plaintiff voluntarily amended her Complaint in an attempt to
meet the objections of the pleaded Statute of Frauds.
Plaintiff in this regard at page 6 of her brief states:
"We were required to amend our pleadings
when the defendant set up the California Statute
of Frauds. In doing so we qualified for the plea of
estoppel."
Plaintiff at page 12 of her brief states:
"The Court, having taken this position that
nothing short of a writing could prove the promise
to make a will, it is remarkable that he ordered a
pre-trial or permitted the case to go to trial at all.
It is incomprehensible when we allege nothing but
an oral contract in our complaint and the part performance thereof by·the delivery of the Woodmen
of the World certificate and the execution and delivery of the will, and the support and maintenance
of all the children to maturity. (E·mphasis ours.)
The court's attention is called to the fact that plaintiff
in her .brief, spends 20 pages, pages 43 to 63 inclusive,
arguing that the "Court should have considered plaintiff's
plea of estoppel." Her complaint was amended to bring her
within the equity jurisdiction of the court. The action
could be nothing other than an action of specific performance of the alleged oral contract. Plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a cause of action.
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Loper vs Flynn 165 P. 2d 256 ·(Cal.)
D·e Mattos vs McGovern 77 P. 2d 522 (CaL)
Beard vs Melvin 140 P. 2d 720 (Cal.)
Murdock vs Swanson 193 P. 2d 81 (Cal.)
Shive vs Barrow 199 P. 2d 693 (Cal.)
See also the case of Andrews vs Aikens 44 Ida.
797, 260 P. 423, 69 A.L.R. and the extensive annotation covering approximately 204 pages immediately following the said case. The annotation
begins at 69 A.L.R. 14 and concludes at page 219.
We also refer the court to the many other cases on this
question cited by us in our brief.
We also claim that the complaint does not state a cause
of action against the defendant because there are no suffi...
cient or any allegations in the plaintiff's amended complaint
showing how or in what manner the plaintiff is the trustee
of an express trust.
We believe that what we have said above should dispose of this case without the consideration of any of the
other questions raised by the plaintiff in her brief and that
the judgment of the lower court should therefor be sustained because:
Plaintiff's amended complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
POINT II
THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS BAR.RED
AGAINST THE REAL PARTIES IN INTE,REST BY
SE1CTIONS 102-9-4 and 102-9-9, U.C.A. 1943, AND IS
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THEREFORE BARRED AGAINS·T THE PLAINTIFF
WHO CLAIMS TO SUE AS THE TRUSTEE OF AN EXPRESS TRUST.
Our argument with respect to Point II appears at
pages 33 to 38 inclusive of this brief. We refer this
court therefore for our argument on this point, to the
above pages.
POINT III

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE
EVIDE.NCE· OF: (A) THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF, LILLIAN JACKSON.
At the outset may we state that we made five objections to the testimony of the plaintiff Lillian Jackson,
ex-wife of the deceased John Jackson at the time she was
on the witness stand. Said objections so made are as follows:
(1) That the plaintiff, Lillian Jackson, is an incompetent witness under the provisions of Section 104-49-2
(Subsection 3) Utah Code Annotated 1943, now Section
104-24-2, Sub-section 3, Chapter 24, of Chapter 58, Session
Laws 1951, commonly known as the ''Dead Man Statute."
(R. page 202).
(2) That under the provisions of Section 1973, California Code of Civil Procedure, an agreement which by its
terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of the
promissor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any
property or to make any provision for any person by will
is invalid unless the same or some note or memorandum
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thereof be in writing and subscribed by the party to be
charged or by his agent and evidence therefor of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or· secondary
evidence of its contents. (R. pag.e 201).
(3) That under the provisions of Section 1624, Civil
Code of California, an agreement which by its terms is
not to be performed during the lifetime of the promissor
or an agreement to devise or bequeath any property or to
make any provision for any person by will is invalid unless
the same or some note or memorandum thereof is in
writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or his
agent. (R. page 202).
(4) That the testimony of Lillian Jackson is an attempt to alter, vary, contradict and change the contents
of a written instrument to wit: Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 which
is attached to and made a part of the plaintiff's Complaint
(R. page 8 to 14), and which agreement is set forth in full
in the Findings (R. page 124 to 130) .
(5) That plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim
against the defendant upon which relief can be granted.
(R. page 202).
Counsel for the plaintiff, in his brief, disregards all
of the objections made to the testimony of the plaintiff,
Lillian Jackson, except one which is obj.ection (1) above.
He says that Lillian Jackson is not an incompetent witness
under the "Dead Man Statute" because she is suing in a
representative capacity, to-wit: As trustee of an express
trust under Section 104-3-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
but which actually should be Rule 17 (a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
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We contend that the objections made to the testimony of the plaintiff and the objection that plaintiff is
an incompetent witness are well taken and should each
be sustained.
( 1) Is the plaintiff an incompetent witness under
the "Dead Man Statute?"
We say she is.
This is an action by Lillian Jackson, the ex-wife of
the deceased, John Jackson, as plaintiff, against Sinda
Jackson, Executrix of the Estate of John Jackson, deceased. Sinda Jackson is the surviving widow of John
Jackson, deceased, and she is the Executrix of the Last
Will and Testament of John Jackson, deceased. Sinda
Jackson as the representative of the Estate of John Jackson, deceased, is sued as defendant by this plaintiff. Lillian
Jackson is the plaintiff and she is also the witness under
consideration in this case. Lillian Jackson as plaintiff and
as witness is opposing and suing the representative of the
estate to the extent that she is seeking by her action and
testimony to take away from the estate the sum of $24,500.00; Sinda Jackson, the executrix and representative
of the estate, the defendant herein, is protecting the integrity of the estate.
Section 104-49-2 (Sub-section 3), Utah Code Annotated 1943, now Section 104-24-2 (Sub-section 3), Chapter.
24 of Chapter 58, Session Laws 1951, hereinafter referred
to as the "Dead Man Statute" reads in part as follows:
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"vV'ho May Not Be Witnesses.- - (3) A party to any civil action, suit or proceeding9 and any person directly interested in the
event thereof, and any person from, through or
under whom such party or interested person derives his interest or title or any part thereof, when
the adverse party in such action, suit or proceeding
claims or opposes, sues or defends, as guardian of
an insane or incompetent person, or as the executor or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of any
deceased person, or as guardian, assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such heir, legatee or
devisee, as to any statement by, or transaction
with, such deceased, insane or incompetent person,
or matter of fact 'vhatever, which must have been
equally within the knowledge of both witness and
such insane, incompetent or deceased person, unless, such witness is called to testify thereto by
such adverse party so claiming or opposing, suing
or defending, in such action, suit or proceeding."
The above section expressly makes incompetent as a
witness, "a party to any civil action, suit or proceeding,"
and it would seem clear that Lillian Jackson, who is both
plaintiff and witness in this case, by the plain language of
the statute is an incompetent witness under said statute.
Counsel in his brief argues. in substance that the language "a party to any civil action, suit or proceeding" has a
special meaning and that the word "party" doesn't. mean
''party to a law suit," because plaintiff is suing as the
"trustee of an express trust."
It is our contention. that the statutory disqualification
as a witness of a person who is "a party to any civil action,
suit or proceeding" means what it says; that is, that the
party to said suit .is dis·qualified and incompetent as a witness. This section of the "Dead Man Statute" makes incom-
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petent as a witness a party to any civil suit or proceeding.
It makes no difference whether the party witness is plaintiff or defendant.
Ewing vs. White, 8 Utah 250, 30 Pac. 984.
Hennefer vs. Hays, 14 Utah 324, 47 Pac. 90.
Kimball vs. McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 259 Pac. 313.
Clark vs. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 Pac. 502.
In the cas,e of Clark vs. George, 234 Pac. (2d) 844,
(Utah) reading from page 847, the court states:
"lone was a party plaintiff. She was properly
prohibited from testifying as to conversations with
the decedent in conformance with our so-called
. "dead man's statute," section 104-49-2 (3), U.C.
A. 1943, Clark vs. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502."
Section 1880, California Code of Civil Procedure, dealing with persons who cannot testify, Section 3, reads as follows:
"3. (Parties, etc., against executors, etc.)
Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or
proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator upon a claim, or demand against the
estate of a deceased person, as to any matter or
fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person."
The California law above quoted is dissimilar to our
Utah statute, to he sure, but the California statute makes
incompetent as witnesses parties to an action or proceeding
against an executor or administrator upon a claim or demand against the estate, etc.
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At common law no person was permitted to become a
witness in an action or proc·eeding to which he was a party
or in which he \vas interested. 70 C. J ., paragraph 260, page
193; 70 C.J., paragraph 261, page 194. The common law
disabilities of witnesses have been abrogated in Utah by
Section 104-49-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, (now Section
104-24-1, Chapter 24 of Chapter 58, Session Laws 1951).
The abrogation of said common law disabilities is subject, however, to the exceptions set forth in Section 10449-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943, one of which exceptions
is the Utah "Dead Man Statute" above s·et forth.
In framing the exceptions provided by said Section
104-49-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943 to the provisions of
Section 104-49-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, (now Section
104-24-1, Session Laws 1951), the Legislature must have
intended to use the words "party" and "parties" to an action
in the usual and appropriate meaning in law; otherwise, it
would not have passed Section 88-2-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which reads as follows:
"Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the
language; but technical words and phrases, and
such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute,
are to be construed according to such peculiar and
appropriate meaning or definition.''
Section 104-49-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, (now Section 104-24-1, Session Laws 1951), is substantially the same
as Section 1879, California Code of Civil Procedure, and
Section 88-2-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, is almost word
for word with Section 16, California Code of Civil Procedure.
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The California courts in construing the meaning of the
words "party" and "parties" to an action or proceeding
under the "Dead Man Statute" have held that executors
and administrators are parties under the law prohibiting
parties in actions to testify.
In the case of Roncelli vs. Fugazi, 186 Pac. 373 (Cal.),
the Court, reading from pages 375 and 376, says:
"While section 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure has often received the consideration of the
appellate courts of this state, the reports do not
show it to have been previously involved in an inquiry to determine whether the word 'parties,' as
therein used, is broad enough in meaning to apply
to a party to the record suing only in his representative capacity. This question is purely one of
interpretation. We can neither abridge nor extend
the scope of the terms of the section, nor should we
concern ourselves with the philosophy of the rule
established by the section, or speculate as to the
motives which impelled the Legislature to enact
it, except it be in aid of the discovery of the real
meaning of its items. The very words of the statute must control. Moore vs. Schofield, 96 Cal. 486,
31 Pac. 532. Its inhibitions have been held to apply
to the testimony of a person who is merely a nominal party to an action. As stated in Blood vs. Fairbanks, 50 c·ai. 420 :
' - - - The statute does not merely exclude parties who have or are supposed to have an interest
adverse to the estate of the decedent, but, by its
terms renders all the nominal parties to the action
incompetent.'
"In framing the exceptions provided by section 1880 to the general enabling act (section 1879,
Code Civ. Proc.), the Legislature must have intended to use the word 'parties' in its usual and
appropriate meaning in law (section 16, Code Civ.
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Proc.). If it had been intended to render the testimony of a party to the record, suing in his representative capacity. admissible undf'r tb e ci, cun1stances stated in the statute, it would have been a
very simple matter to have so declared in the statute itself, as \Yas done in the Washington statute,
\Yhere it is provided that the exclusion of the testimony of a party to the record 'shall not apply to
parties of record who sue or defend in a representative or fiduciary capacity and who have no
further interest in the action.' Since our statute of
exclusion uses the word 'parties' in its broad generic sense, we do not deem it proper to restrict its
meaning to smaller compass, thus confining its application to parties to the record suing in their individual capacities.
"Under an Ohio statute providing that 'a party shall not testify where the adverse party is - - an executor of a deceased person,' etc. (Rev_ St. &
5242), the Supreme Court of that state held that
the inhibition of the statute applied to an executor
prosecuting an action in his representative capacity against the defendant as executrix. Farley v.
Lisey, 55 Ohio St. 627, 45 N. E. 1103. In that case
the court said :
'True, the plaintiff was prosecuting the action
in his representative character as executor of the
lessor; but the issues in the action were joined between him as such and the defendant; and he was
interested in maintaining the issues in his ~behalf,
not only in his representative capacity, but individually also to the extent, at least, that his compensation was affected by the amount recovered
in the action. The statute has reference to the adverse character which the parties sustain toward
each other as parties in the action at the time of
the trial, and not necessarily to their relation as
parties to the transaction which is the subject of
the action or defense; and, unless these parties
were adverse, there were none in the action, for
they were the only parties. It is said the plaintiff
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might have resigned as executor, and then he
would have been competent to testify as desired;
but then he would no longer be a party to the
action, and therefore not within the inhibition of
the statute. But, being a party to the action when
his testimony was offered, it was properly excluded.' "
The Iowa Court, in considering the question at issue
in this case, in the case of In Re Conner's E~state, 36 N.W.
(2d) 833, reviews the Iowa cases on this point and at pages
839 and 840 says:
" - - - Over objections by appellants that he
was an incompetent witness under the dead man
statute, section 622.4, the cou:rt permitted Mr.
Updegraff, executor of Zanette's estate, to repeat
com~munications between the witness and Zanette
in which she detailed the story of Ellis' lineage.
Error is predicated upon these rulings. We conclude this assignment of error is well founded.
"Mr. Updegraff was a party to the action
within the purview of the dead man statute. Williams v. Barrett, 52 Iowa 637, 641, 3 N. W. 690,
693, states:
'Counsel for appellent contend that the witness was competent because he had no interest
whatever in the question (concerning which he
testified). - - - This may be conceded, but the language (of the statute) --- is plain and explicit
that 'no party to any action or proceeding - - shall be examined as a witness - - - against the executor of heir at law - - -of such deceased persons., ---John T. Clark was a party to the action,
and for that reason was disqualified as a witness
to testify to personal transactions between himself and the deceased. We think the fact that the
other defendants were not necessarily jointly liable with him, and that separate actions might
have been maintained against the defendant,
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makes no difference. There was but one action on
trial, and the witness, being a proper party defendant therein, \Yas by the very terms of the statute incompetent to testify to the facts under consideration.'
"Bohle v. Brooks et al., 225 Iowa 980, 983, 282 N. W.
351, 353, states:
' - - - Even though the interest of Mr. Brooks
is only nominal, yet he is a party to the action,
and in conformity with the statute and our former pronouncements, as such party he is incompetent to testify as to the personal transactions
with the decedent.'
"Burton v. Baldwin, 61 Iowa 283, 285, 16
N.W. 110, 111, held incompetent the testimony of
Sophronia Baldwin who was made a party to a
partition proceeding for the purpose of ascertaining and assigning her dower, and stated:
' - - - She is a party to the action; her testimony relates to a personal communication between herself and a person now deceased, and is
given against the heir at law of such deceased
person. It ·is true, she has no interest in common
with the other defendants against the plaintiff,
but such adverse interest does not seem to be
necessary in order to the exclusion of the testimony.'
''In the language of Clinton Savings Bank v.
Underhill, 115 Iowa 292, 294, 88 N.W. 357, 358:

' - - - A mere nominal party, or one who has
no substantial interest in the action, is disqualified under this ·section.'
"To the same effect is Nugent v. Dittel, 213
Iowa 671, 239 N. W. 559.
"In Fry v. Gullion, 143 Iowa 719, 724, 121
N.W. 563, 565, 21 Ann. Cas. 285, parties to partiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion proceedings filed a disclaimer. The court said
this 'may possibly have removed the disqualification of interest but it could not remove the disqualification which still attached to them as parties, unless we are able to say that they were no
longer proper parties to the action.'
"James v. Fairall, 168 Iowa 427, 431, 148 N.
W. 1029, was an action to set aside a will. A devisee who had been made a party defendant filed a
disclaimer and the action was dismissed as to
him. The court held the circumstances indicated
collusion with plaintiff and the dismissal did not
have the effect of making his evidence competent."
"An article by Mason Ladd in 19 Iowa Law
Review 521, 526, discusses the decisions and
states:
'The statute excludes parties because they
are parties and as distinguished from persons interested in the litigation. - - - The cases in the
above situations have applied literally the statute
which is apparently based on the theory that
even nominal parties would be sufficiently concerned in the interests which they merely represent to be unsafe as witnesses.'
"In considering his competency under the
dead man statute Updegraff as a witness may not
be separated from Updegraff, executor. This
court held in Schmid v. Kreismer, 31 Iowa 479,
that while generally an administrator is a competent witness for the estate, he is not. competent
in a case where the adverse party is also an administrator."
Counsel for the plaintiff cite·s and relies upon the case
of In Re Van Alstine, 26 Utah 193; 72 Pac. 942. The case of
In Re Van Alstine does not support counsel's position for
two reasons :
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(1) Because the Van Alstine case is a case involving
a will contest and the Utah Case of Miller vs. Livingston, 31
Utah 415; 88 Pac. 338, holds that a will contest is not within the_ statute and the guardian ad litem contesting the will
is not within the class excluded. It is settled in this state by
the Livingston case that a will contest is not within the
statute. The case of Miller vs. Livingston was an action by
the daughter against the administratrix of her father's
estate to have the will revoked because of undue influence
of the decedent's second wife, not the contestant's mother.
The plaintiff called other daughters to testify as to conversations with and the conduct of the testator and they were
not permitted to testify. The court held this to be error. The
court in the case of Miller vs. Livingston, 88 Pac. 338, reading from pages 344 and 345, states:
"The statute in this regard is intended to
protect the estates of deceased persons from assaults, 'and relates to proceedings wherein the
decision sought by the party so testifying would
tend to reduce or impair the estate, and does not
relate to the relative rights of the heirs or devisees as to the distribution of an estate in a proceeding by which the estate itself is in no event
to be reduced or impaired.' (Citing cases). These
authorities, and other which can be cited, hold
that the controversy such as here is between living parties, who, on the one side, are the devisees
or legatees under the will, and on the other, the
heirs at law of the testator. The former claim to
take the estate under the will, the latter, under
the statute regulating the descent of estates, insisting that the alleged will is a nullity. The act
of the testator in making the alleged will is the
only subject-matter of the investigation. The estate of the testator is not interested. The interests of those claiming to succeed to it either by
operation of law or by operation of the will are
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alone involved. The estate remains intact and undiminished whatever may be the result of the
controversy, and the subject-matter of the investigation is not a transaction with nor a statement
by the decedent. As to such an investigation, the
parties to the suit and those interested in the result thereof are upon terms of equality in regard
to the opportunity of giving testimony. Our conclusion, therefore, is that all the parties interested are competent to testify to any fact which is
relevant and material to the issues involved, and
that the court erred in excluding the proffered
testimony." and,
(2) Because at the trial in the Van Alstine case when
Dora S. Van Alstine, the guardian ad litem, was called as a
witness for the minors, the only objection made to her competency as a witness was, reading from page 943:
"on the ground that under the provisions of
Section 3348 of the Revised Statutes, if judgment should be rendered against the contestants
of the will- - - cost might be assessed against her
and she, therefore, had a direct interest in the
event of the suit and was disqualified as a witness
under Sub-division 3, paragraph 3413, Rev. St.
1898."
The objection was based entirely on the interest of the
witness and not upon the fact that the witness was a party
to the action, and the question of whether a party to an
action is dis~qualified as a witness was never presented to
nor decided by the court.
Counsel cites the case of Grieve vs. Howard, 54 Utah
225; 180 Pac. 423, as holding that, "Mack Howard, a defendant, was held to be qualified to testify because of the fact
that he had no interest, a merely nominal defendant." We
do not understand the Grieve case to hold as counsel states.
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In the Grieve case a special administrator brought an action
to set aside for undue influence in procuring it, a deed executed by the deceased to the defendant. The defendant
sought to rule out testimony of the administrator as to
transactions equally within his knowledge and that of the
deceased. This was an attempt to close the mouth of one
who endeavored to protect or increase the estate. The grantee attempted to use the rule in reverse. The statute was
not applicable to make incompetent such witness.
Judge Thurman in the Grieve vs. Howard case, 180 Pac.
423, reading from page 429, says:
" - - - A reasonably careful analysis of this
statute will conclusively demonstrate that, in
view of the relation and character of the parties,
the matter was not within the statute. As. we understand the situation, defendant was defending
not as an heir of the deceased, but as a grantee
under the deed executed by her. The relation was
not such as to entitle him to object to the testimony on the grounds that it was prohibited by
the statute. Miller v. Livingstone, 31 Utah at
page 435, 88 Pac. 338; 40 Cyc. 2270 to 2275, inclusive."
The last Utah case cited by counsel in his brief is the
case of Staats vs. Staats, 63 Utah 470; 226 Pac. 677. In this
case the testator's son, who was also the surviving partner,
sued his mother and intervening brothers. The court in permitting the plaintiff and other heirs to testify concerning
transactions with the deceased, reading from 226 Pac. at
page 680 says :
"In view, therefore, that she is here claiming
in her own right the other heirs are competent
witnesses. - - - That the statute has no application where the controversy arises between or
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among the heirs and merely involves questions
relating to their respective rights as such and
where there is no assault upon the estate."
Judge Wolfe, in commenting upon the case of Staats
vs. Staats, in Maxfield vs. Sainsbury, 172 Pac. (2d) 122
(Utah), and reading from page 131 states, that the Staats
case is somewhat puzzling and concludes that the Staats
case,
"appears to be technically wrong so far as
correctly applying Section 104-49-2 (3), Utah
Code Annotated 1943, is concerned."
This Court in the case of Wood vs. Fox, 8 Utah 380,
32 Pac. 48, has held that an action to establish a resulting
trust against the estate of a deceased person was a claim
or demand against such estate. This case was carried to
the Supreme Court of the United States and is reported
in 17 Sup. Ct. 713, 41 L. Ed. 1145. The Supreme Court of
the United States said, speaking through Justice Harlan:
"We cannot doubt that the claims as asserted
in this suit by Whitney are within the meaning
of the Utah statute, claims or demands against
the estate of a deceased person. - - - The Supreme
court of Utah properly rejected the suggestion
that such claim or demand was not against the
estate of Lawrence."
The court held that the plaintiff was an incompetent
witness as to testimony of transactions with the decedent.
We have copied from and we are grateful for the very
scholarly discussions of the so-called "Dead Man Statute"
in the article written by Mr. Justice Wolfe in 13 Rocky
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Mountain Law Review, 282, (June, 1941) which also appeared in the Utah Bar Journal, Volum.e 11, July-August,
1941, Nos. 7 and 8. It has been of considerable assistance
to us.
Plaintiff cites 58 Am. Jur., Section 282, which reads
as follows:
"A statute disqualifying a 'party' from testifying as to transactions with a deceased person
does not apply to one who is not a party or interested therein but is a mere witness. According to
some authorities, although on its face the statute
disqualifies every person who is made a party to
the record, its application is limited to those persons who are properly joined as parties, and further to those of the proper parties to the record
who are parties to the issue."
To support the position that plaintiff is a competent
witness and after citing the above section, counsel for
plaintiff abruptly concludes in his brief at page 23 as
follows:
"Thus it appears that the term 'party' is
generally meant to include only those who are
directly interested in the result of the suit."
This is, however, not our statute. Our Dead Man
Statute clearly makes incompetent (1) a party to any
civil action, suit or proceeding, and it also makes incompetent (2) any person directly interested in the event thereof, and also makes incompetent (3) any person from,
through or under whom such party or interested person
derives his interest or title or any part thereof.
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Under the plain reading of the Utah Dead Man Statute one does not. have to have any direct interest in the
result of the suit to be incompetent as a witness. It is sufficient to make one incompetent as a witness if one is a
party to any civil action, suit or proceeding.
A careful reading of Section 282, above cited by the
plaintiff, seems to be against plaintiff's position rather
than for her. The last portion of the quoted section refers
to "parties to the issue." Our Dead Man Statute says "a
party to any civil action, suit or proceeding." We do not
think the cited section applicable under our Dead Man
Statute.
Plaintiff cites the Minnesota case of Exsted vs. Exsted, 202 Minn. 521, 279 N.W. 554, 117 A.L.R. 599. This case
is not in point and does not sustain plaintiff's contention.
The Minnesota Dead Man statute states: "It shall not be
competent for any party to an action - - - to give evidence
therein of or concerning any controversy - - - relative to
any matter at issue betwe·en the parties." 2 Masson's Minn.
St. 1927, paragraph 9817 (MSA, paragraph 594.04). It has
been held that the term "party to an action," under the
above statute, means a party to the issue to which the testimony relates, and not merely a party to the record,
Bowers vs. Schuler, 54 Minn. 99, 55 N.W. 817, and that an
executor or administrator while a necessary party to the
record is not a party to the issue, Exsted vs. Exsted, above
cited. The Exsted case is, therefore, not in point under the
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Utah Dead Man Statute. The two statutes are entirely different.
The case of Doty vs. Doty, 118 Kentucky 204, 80 S.
W. 803, 2 L. R. A. (NS) 713, cited by plaintiff is not in
point. The Kentucky dead man statute is entirely different
and is in no way even similar to the Utah Dead Man Statute. The Kentucky statute provides, "No person shall testify for himself." Our statute says, "A party to any civil
action, suit or proceeding," is incompetent as a witness.
The Kentucky case is not in point under the Utah dead
man statute. The two statutes are entirely different.
Lillian Jackson was therefore, an incompetent witness under the plain mandate of the Utah D'ead Man Statute which declares that, "A party to any civil action, suit
or proceeding," is incompetent as a witness.
We believe that from what we have said above it is conclusive that Lillian Jackson is an incompetent witness. However, we desire to call the Court's attention to the interest
of the plaintiff in the result of this action and the peculiar manner in which this interest shows up. Plaintiff, in
paragraph 4 of her Complaint, alleges, "That said decedent in his lifetime became indebted to this plaintiff and
to her sons and daughters in the sum of $24,500.00, such
indebtedness to be paid upon the death of the decedent."
(R. Page 1) . Paragraph 5 of the Complaint says in part,
"That on or about August 10, 1950, the plaintiff duly filed
her claim against the said Sinda Jackson as Executrix of
said estate for the sum of $24,500." (R. page 1 and 2). Said
claim filed by the plaintiff against the Executrix of said esstate of John Jackson, deceased, says in part, "thus leaving
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due to this claimant and her children, the real parties in interest," (R. Page 6) and again in said claim plaintiff says,
"That the amount of the foregoing claim, to-wit: Twentyfour Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($24,500.00) is justly due to said claimant and her children." (R. Page 6).
Said claim, upon which this action is based, was filed
September 1, 1950, by Lillian Jackson for the benefit of
herself and her children, namely, Belle Dennis,
Jeanne
Raab, Fanny Jackson, a deceased daughter, Joyce McKee
Jesse Jackson, John Jackson, Jr., and Glenn Jackson.
Strange things went on in regard to the claims filed
against the Estate of John Jackson, deceas-ed. Lillian Jackson, the plaintiff, filed her claim upon which this action
is brought on September 1, 1950, for and on behalf of herself and her seven children, as aforesaid, one of whom,
Fanny Jackson, was dead. On October 16, 1950, Belle Dennis, Jeanne Raab, Joyce McKee, Jesse Jackson and Glenn
Jackson, and on November 30, 1950, John Jackson, they
being all of the living children of the plaintiff and the deceased, John Jackson, each filed separate identical claims
against the Estate of John Jackson, deceased. A copy of
said identical claims so filed by each of said children
reads, except as to title of Court and cause and acknowledgem·ent, as follows :
"By reason of a marriage settlement made
between John Jackson deceased, and Lillian Jackson, fo~mer wife of John Jackson and the mother
of this claimant, wherein and whereby the said
John Jackson agreed with Lillian Jackson, as a
part of said marriage settlement, that he would
provide by will that claimant would receive the
s urn of _---------------- _--------------------------- ____ ____________ ____ ____ ___ $3,500.00
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upon the death of the said John Jackson; which
said "~ill was duly executed on the 7th day of September, 1920, and duly filed with the clerk of the
District Court of Grand County, State of Utah, a
copy of said will being hereto attached and made
a part of this claim.
"That there were seven sons and daughters of the
said John Jackson and my mother Lillian Jackson,
and it was provided in said will that each thereof
should receive the sum of $3500; that since the
execution of said will one of the daughters has
died, leaving one-sixth of her share of said bequest provided for in said will to this claimant-$ 583.33
$4,083.33
"Said gift and bequest in said will were made
at the express request of my mother, Lillian Jackson, for our mutual benefit, and in lieu of any
provisions for the sopport, education, comfort and
maintenance of the children of said John Jackson
and Lillian Jackson."
That each and all of said claims, except the claim of
John Jackson, were rejected on October 16, 1950, and notice of rejection was duly served and filed October 16, 1950,
with the Clerk of the Court; that the claim of John Jackson was rejected on the 30th day of November, 1950; that
notice of rejection of said claim was duly S·erved ap.d filed
November 30, 1950, with the Clerk of the Court; that the
time for presenting claims against the Estate of John
Jackson, deceased, expired on th·e lOth day of October, A.
D. 1950; Decree establishing due and legal notice to creditors in the Estate of John Jackson, deceased, was duly
made and entered by the Court on the 26th day of January, 1951. E~ach and all of said claims were rejected by
the Executrix of the Estate of John Jackson, deceased.;
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notice of rejection of ·each of said claims was duly served
and filed with the Clerk of the Court; more than three
months have expired since the serving and filing of each
of such notices of Rej-ection; no suit has ever been filed
in any Court whatsoever against the Executrix of the
Estate of John Jackson, deceased, by any of said living children on any of said claims so presented, rejected and filed.
The only suit ever filed to enforce any claim against
the Estate of John Jackson, deceased, is the Complaint
filed in this action by Lillian Jackson, as plaintiff, against
Sinda Jackson, Executrix of the Estate of John Jackson,
deceased, based on the clai·m presented and filed by the
plaintiff, Lillian Jackson, on S.eptember 1, 1950, as aforesaid. E.ach and all of the living children of Lillian Jackson, the plaintiff, and the deceased, John Jackson, has
abandoned his claim filed against said e·state as aforesaid.
In any event, none of the living children has ever at any
time filed any suit to recover on any of the claims so filed
and rejected as aforesaid, and each and all of said claims
are barred by the provisions of Section 102-9-4, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, and Section 102-9-9, Utah Code Annotated 1943. We pleaded these matters as a defense to this
action (our ans:wer) to complaint as amended. (R. Page
48 to 54).
Yet, this plaintiff shows her interest by prosecuting
this action and has gone to the extent of taking an appeal
to this Court.
There is another interesting matter in connection
with this case. Fanny Jackson, one of the children for
whos·e benefit plaintiff claims she brings this lawsuit, is
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dead. She died long before any claim was ever presented
by the plaintiff and long before this law-suit was ever
started. No legal representative of the Estate of Fanny
Jackson, deceased, has ever been appointed and no legal
representative of the Estate of Fanny Jackson, deceased,
has ever presented a claim against the Estate of John
Jackson, deceased, and yet, Lillian Jackson, the plaintiff
in this action, presumes to file such a claim against the
Estate of John Jackson, deceased, for and on behalf of
said F~nny Jackson, deceas·ed, and then presumes to file
suit for and on her behalf without ever being appointed
administratrix or executrix of the Estate of Fanny Jackson, deceased. The plaintiff claims to be the trustee of
an express trust for all of her living children and also
claims to be the trustee of an express trust for her deceased daughter upon the curious theory set forth in paragraph 8 of plaintiff's Complaint, which reads as follows:
"8. That the aforesaid agreement with reference
to the making of a will by the said John Jackson
and providing that their children should be beneficiaries thereof was made with this plaintiff
in trust, to be administered by her in behalf of
the following named sons and daughters, the issue of the marriage between this plaintiff and
John Jackson, namely:
Age at time of
making will
Belle Dennis, formerly Belle J acks.on 24 years
Jeanne Raab, form·erly Aldiva Jackson 11 years
16 years
Fanny Jackson
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Joyce McKee, formerly
Josephine Jackson
Jesse Jackson
John Jackson, Jr.
Glenn Jackson

6
22
18
8

years
years
years
years

"That subsequent to the making of said will,
one of the above named children, Fanny Jackson,
a daughter, died and that the heirs of the said
deceased consist of the said above named living
children and that by reason thereof this plaintiff
is entitled to recover the interest of said deceased
child subject to the probate of this court, for the
benefit of the living childr.en of this plaintiff and
said John Jackson, deceased, and this action is
prosecuted in behalf of the heirs· of said estate
as shown by the aforesaid will, Exhibit 3." (R.
page 4).
Lillian Jackson, the plaintiff, is the mother
of Fanny Jackson, deceased, and as such she is
one of her heirs at law, if not the sole heir at law of
said Fanny Jackson, deceased. As such heir at law,
the plaintiff is directly interested in any recovery
made in this action- against the Estate of John
Jackson, deceased.
We, therefore, conclude that Lillian Jackson,
the plaintiff, is an incompetent witness for two
reasons under the Utah Dead Man Statute:
1. Because she is a party to the action, and
2. Because she is a person directly interested in the event thereof.
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Objections (2) and (3) to the testimony of Lillian
Jackson, above set forth, will be argued together as the
same law and reasoning applies to both. This is an action
to enforce an alleged oral contract claimed to have been
made on the 22nd day of April 1918, at Orland, Glenn
County, State of California, between the p2aintiff and
John Jackson. Plaintiff claims that under said alleged
oral contract, John Jackson agreed to make a will and bequeath to his seven children the sum of $3,500.00 each.
The California Courts have construed Section 1973, California Code of Civil Procedure and Section 1624, Civil Code
of California many times. In the case of Bogan vs.. Wiley,
decided January 14, 1946, 164 Pac. (2d) 912, at page 914,
the Court says :
"There is no merit in the appeal and hence
the judgment must be affirmed upon the rules of
law so well settled that a brief reference to the
decisions will suffice.
" ( 1) The code sections declare that an oral
contract to devise or bequeath property by will
is invalid. Since their enactment our decisions
have consistently held that such contracts are unenforceable, Hagan v. McNary, 170 Cal. 141, 144,
148 P. 937, L.R.A. 1915E, 562; Trout v. Ogilvie,
41 Cal. App. 167, 173, 182, P. 333; De Mattos v.
McGovern 25 Cal. App. 2d 429, 432, 77 P. 2d 522;
Zaring v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 2d 227, 231, 106 P.
2d 224; Smith v. Bliss, 44 Cal. App. 2d 171, 175,
112 P. 2d 30; Long v. Rumsey, 12 Cal. 2d 334, 341,
84 P. 2d 146; Rotea v. Izuel, 14 Cal. 2d 605, 607,
95 P. 2d 927, 125 A.L.R. 1424."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
The Supreme Court of California in the case of Giles
vs. Reed, 186 Pac. 614, reading from page 615, states:
"The chief error urged by appellant is predicted upon the ruling of the court in sustaining
defendant's objections to questions whereby it
was sought to elicit testimony tending to prove
that deceased in her lifetime orally agreed with
plaintiff, for the consideration named, to make
a will devising to her the real estate described in
the complaint. That the alleged contract was
invalid, by reason of there being no note or memorandum in writing and subscribed by deceased
admits of no question (Subdivision 7 § 1624, Civil
Code); hence there was no error in the ruling."
In the case of Stevenson vs. PantaJ.eone, 21 Pac. (2d)
703 (Cal) one of the objections upon which the offered
testimony vvas excluded was based upon Section 1624 of
the Civil Code and the obj e~tion was also predicated on
Section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure above mentioned. The above court reading from page 706 says:
"The ruling of the court sustaining the obJections to the offered evidence was correct, because the agreement was not in writing."
The a:bove cases and the many other cases cited in
our brief seem to us to be conclusive that the testimony
of Lillian Jackson was also barr-ed by the two s.ections of
the California Code above mentioned, and that the obj ections made to said testimony as set forth in (2) and (3)
above are well taken, and should be sustained.
(4) The testimony offered by Lillian Jackson was an
attempt to alter, vary, contradict, ·change and add to the
terms of a written instrument. The objection to her testimony should also be sustained on this ground.
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The plaintiff bring·s this action to recover for the
breach of an alleged oral contract to make a will entered
into by the plaintiff with John Jackson, now deceased, on
the 22nd day of April, 1918. Plaintiff claims that prior to,
contemporaneously with and at the sa~me time that the
written agreement of April 22, 1918, was entered into, decedent orally agreed that he would make a will in which
he would bequeath to each of his children, the issue of the
marriage of the plaintiff and said decedent, the sum of
$3500.00. Nothing is said in the written agreement, however, about this alleged oral agreement on the part of the
decedent to make said will leaving to the children the
sum of $3500.00 each. The testimony offered by the plaintiff as a witness to prove this oral contract is in direct
conflict with the written agreement entered into between
the plaintiff and her ex-husband, the dec-edent. The written agreement is fully set forth in the Findings of Fact
(R. Page 124 to 130). The plaintiff pleaded this very
agreement and expressly made this written agreement a
part of her complaint. (R. Page 2). The defendant admitted the making and entering into of said written agreement.
There IS no ambiguity whatsoever in this written
agreement. It is clear, concise, specific and needs no explanation. It sets forth the entire agreement. Th·ere is
no fraud or mistake alleged, and none proved. Plaintiff in
said written agreement agreed with the decedent that she
would bring up and support the children for the consideration of a property s·ettlement of the approximate value
of $28,689.00, which sum she received in full in 1918. Now,
approximately 32 years after the making and entering into
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of said written agreement, solemnly made and sworn to
by the plaintiff, and after the death of the dec-edent, she
comes into this Court and tries to tell this Court that at
the time of the making and entering into of said written
agreement it was also orally agreed that Mr. Jackson
agreed with her in consideration of her taking care of the
children which she had already agreed to do, that he would
make a will and bequeath to the children the sum of $3500
each. This is in direct contradiction to the explicit terms
and provisions of the written agreement of April 22, 1918,
·and is an attempt to alter, vary, contradict, change and
add to the terms of said written agreement.
Parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary,
add to or subtract from the terms of a written instrument
and the evidence in this case does not come within any of
the exceptions to the above mentioned general rule.
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Starley et.
al. vs. Deseret Foods Corporation et al, 74 Pac. (2d) 1221,
reading from page 1224, states:
"Courts have been quite ready to open the
case to parol evidence to explain the intention of
the maker where there is anything on the face of
the note giving rise to ambiguity. This view is
well indicated by the cases cited by appellant. But
where there is no ambiguity, the rule will not be
relaxed. The intention of the parties must be
gathered from the instrument itself. Any other
rule would tend to destroy the value of written
instruments.. (Citing cases)''.
The Court at page 1224 also states:
"This court has many tim·es held that in the
absence of fraud, mistake, or ambiguity parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or explain the terms
of a written instrument. (Citing cases)"
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In the case of Combined Metals, Inc., et al. vs. Bastian, et al, 267 Pac. 1020 (Utah), the Court, reading from
page 1027, states:
" - - - When the testimony of such additional
oral agreement was offered, Bastian's objections
thereto were overruled. We think the court
erred in the ruling. The doctrine is familiar that
when parties put their negotiations into writing,
in such terms as import a legal obli:sation, and on
its face a completed contract, without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of the engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the whole
of the engagement of the parties and the extent
and manner of their undertaking have been reduced to writing, and that parol evidence is not
admissible to vary or contradict the terms of
such writing or add or substitute new or diff.2rent
or additional terms. (Citing cases)"
We could cite many more Utah cases, but we feel that
the above cases are sufficient on this subject. The obj ection to plaintiff's testimony should also be sustained on this
ground.
(5) That plaintiff's amended Complaint fails to state
a claim against the defendant upon which relief can
granted.

be

We have heretofore argued this matter at Page

12 to 15 of our brief and we believe from what we have
there said, that this objection is also well taken.
We believe that from what we have said, and the
authorities in supj)Ort thereof, that we have successfully
answered all of the arguments raised by plaintiff in her
brief and designated as plaintiff's Point 1, (a), (b), (c)
and (d).
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POINT III

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE
EVIDENCE OF:
(B).

THE TESTIMONY OF KNOX PATTERSON.

At the time of the trial of this action Knox Patterson,
who was one of the attorneys for the plaintiff during the
trial of the case before the District Judge and who is also
attorney for the plaintiff on this appeal, took the stand
as a witness to testify for and on behalf of the plaintiff.
Mr. Patterson attempted to testify (1) as to conversations
which he had with John Jackson and Lillian Jackson in his
office at Moab, Utah, on or about the month of June, 1917,
relative to a divorce action which he was filing for and on
behalf of Lillian Jackson and a proposed property settlement between these two people and (2) as to a conversation had in 1920 with John Jackson at Patterson's law office at Moab, Utah, at which time John Jackson had Knox
Patterson prepare his will dated September 7, 1920, (Pl.
Ex. I) and at which time it is claimed he (Jackson) told
Patterson that he was preparing said will pursuant to an
alleged oral promise he had made to Lillian Jackson at
Orland, California, to the effect that he (Jackson) would
will each of the seven children of John and Lillian Jackson
the sum of $3,500.00 if Lillian Jackson would execute the
said written agreement of April 22, 1918. Defendant objected to the testimony of Mr. Patterson upon the following grounds :
(1) That it was heresay, immaterial, irrelevant and
incompetent. (R. Page 176).
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(2) That under the provisions of Section 1973, C~ali
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, an agreement which by its
terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of the
promisor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any property or to make any provision for any person by will is
invalid and unenforceable unless the same or some note
or memorandum thereof be in writing and subscribed by
the party to be charged or by his agent and evidence
therefore of the agreement can not be received without
the writing or secondary evidence of its contents.
(R.
pages 180 and 183).
(3) That under the provisions of Section 1624, Civil
Code of California, an agreement which by its terms is
not to be performed during the lifetime of the promissor,
or an agreement to devise or bequeath any property or to
make any provision for any person by will is invalid and
unenforceable unless the same or some note or mernorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to
be charged or his agent. (R. page·s 180 and 183).
(4) That the testimony of Knox Patterson is an attempt to alter, vary, contradict and change the contents
of a written instrument, to wit: the will dated September 7, 1920 (Pl. E.x. I), also found in the Findings of the
Court, (R. Pages, 138-140). Our objection is found at R.
page 183.
(5) That Knox Patterson is an incompetent witness
under the provisions of Section 104-49-3 (2) Utah Code
Annotated 1943, now being Section 104-24-8 (2) of the
Judicial Code, Laws of Utah, 1951. (R. pages 180-183).
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Plaintiff in her brief at pages 28 to 32 inclusive, discusses the question as to whether or not Knox Patterson
may testify in this action but she disregards entirely all
of the objections made to the testimony of Knox Patterson
except one, which is objection marked (5) above.
In substance, the same objections made to the testimony of Knox Patterson were made to the testimony of
Lillian Jackson during the trial. We have devoted considerable space in this brief to the proposition that Lillian
Jackson cannot testify for the reason that her testimony
would alter, vary, contradict and change the said written
instrument of April 22, 1918, entered into between Lillian
and John Jackson, and for the same reason the testimony
of Knox Patterson cannot be admitted -to vary, contradict, add to or change the plain terms of the will of September 7, 1920, and would circumvent the provisions of
Section 1973, California Code of Civil Procedure and Section 1624 of Civil Code of California, which are the identical objections made to the testimony of Knox Patterson
as set forth in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) above. As
the same rules apply to the objections made to the admission of the testimony of Knox Patterson as do to the admissions of the testimony of Lillian Jackson, we shall not cite
authorities here in support of our position that the testimony of Knox Patterson was properly objected to on. the
grounds as stated in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) above,
but we do refer this court to that portion of our brief at
pages 39 to 43 which covers this subject as it relates
to the testimony of Lillian Jackson and which is likewise
controlling as to the objections raised to the testimony of
Knox Patterson.
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Section 104-49-3 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
now Section 104-24-8 (2) of our Judicial Code, Laws of
Utah, 1951, reads in part as follows:
"Privileged Communications.
'~There are particular relations in which it
is the policy of the law to encourage confidence
and to preserve it inviolate. Therefore, a person
can not be examinPd a~ a witness in the following cases:
"(2) An attorney can not, without the con-

sent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given therein, in the course of professional
employment; nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer or clerk be examined, without the
consent of his employer, concerning any fact, the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.''
Plaintiff did not at the trial nor does she in her brief
contend that Mr. Patterson was not the attorney for John
Jackson at the time he drew the will of September 7, 1920,
(Pl. Ex. I.) and at which time the said conversations between Knox Patterson and John Jackson took place.
In connection with Mr. Patterson's employment as an
attorney for John Jackson, we quote from his testimony
given at the trial of this case:
"Q. Were you acquainted with John Jackson,
during his lifetime?
"A y es.
"Q Did you do legal services for him?
"A Yes, time and again.
"Q Did you also do legal services for Lillian Jackson?
"A Yes, she and her husband together.
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Over how many years?
"A It would run from 1909 until 1925, I would
say so far as John is concerned.

"Q

And were you on a retainer basis during that
time?
"A No, never.

"Q

"A
"A

"The Court. Did you draw the will for him at
that time?
y es, s1r.
.
"The Court. Did he pay you for that service?
I don't know, I can't remember about that but
he did not pay me for the divorce, because he
thought I hadn't given him a fair deal and
that I had sided in with his wife.
"The Court.
ney?

You acted for him as his attor-

"A I acted for his wife, as her attorney, bebecause, he told me that she had said that she
wanted Knox Patterson to draw the will." (R.
Pages 174 and 186).
The trial court also found in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law the following:
"That from 1909 to 1925, Knox Patterson represented the plaintiff and decedent, John Jackson, as an attorney at law at various times with
no retainer fee from either at any time; that on
September 7, 1920, John Jackson went to the law
offices of Patterson and Constantine in Moab,
Utah, and had them draft the will dated September 7, 1920, and which is set forth in full above,
which will be duly executed; that Patterson and
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Constantine mailed a copy of said will to Belle
Dennis, the oldest daughter of John Jackson, who
was named in said will as executrix thereof and
in said letter of transmittal, Patterson and Constantine stated that they had prepared it for her
father, John Jackson, and were mailing it to
her at his request. John Jackson sealed the original will in an envelope and filed it with the
County Clerk of Grand county, Utah, and said envelope contains the written and printed material
set forth above in these Findings." (R. pages 148
and 149) . (For letter of transmittal of will see
(Plaintiff's Ex. H).
There can be no question from the testimony given
by Mr. Patterson at the trial, the letter Ex. H, and the
finding of the Court, above quoted, that an attorneyclient relationship was established between John Jackson
and Knox Patterson at the time Mr. Patterson drew the
will for John Jackson on September 7, 1920.
The case of State vs. Snowden, 23 Utah 318, 65 P. 479
(1901), was one in which the defendant was tried for the
crime of adultery and in the course of the trial, o'bj ection
was made to statements made by the defendant to his attorney about the alleged crime on the grounds that they
were privileged under the Utah statute and that the attorney therefore could not testify. Our Court, in dis.cussing this question and also the question of whether an attorney-client relationship had been established between
the defendant and the attorney sought to be questioned,
said:

" * * 'Whatever facts, therefore, are communicated by client to counsel solely on account of
that relation, such counsel are not at liberty,
even if they wish, to disclose ; and the law holds
their testimony incompetent.' In the late case
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of Bruley v. Garvin (Wis.) 81 N.W. 1038, it is
held not to be 'absolutely essential that a fee
should be paid, or that there should be an actual retainer,' and that it is sufficient if the
attorney's legal advice was sought for and he
could be considered for the time being the legal adviser of the other. Supporting the same
rule is Jones, Ev. § 767, and cases cited. The
protection of the statute applies to conversations
with the attorney in negotiating to em p 1 o y
him. It may be necessary to disclose to the a ttorney many confidential matters connected with
the case before it is determined whether a retainer will be given or accepted. Of course, a different rule would apply to communications made
to the attorney after he had informed the person
that no employment would or could be accepted.
Nelson v. Becker (Neb.) 48 N.W. 962, cited with
approval in Farley v. Peebles. (Neb.) 70 N.W. 231.
In Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394, 36 Am. Rep.
627, the attorney divided his attentions between
the bar of justice and the bar of Bacchus. While
presiding at the latter place, a former client, in
the presence of several others, but perhaps not in
their hearing, submitted a hypothetical proposition to the attorney at the bar. No fee was paid,
neither was a suit pending nor contemplated. In
a suit afterwards brought between third parties,
the court held the saloon conversation privileged,
because it appeared from all the facts that it was
a confidential communication in the course of
'All
professional employment. It is there said:
communications made by a client to his counsel
for the purpose of professional advice or assistance are privileged, whether they relate to a suit
pending or .contemplated, or to any other matter
proper for such advise or aid,' -citing Britton v.
Lorenz, 45 N.Y. 51; Turquand v. Knight, 2 Mees.
& W. 98. See, also, Williams v. Fitch, 18 N.Y. 551;
Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Ba:vb. Ch. 595, 49 Am. Dec.
189; Green 1 Ev. (15th Ed.) § 240. The underlying principle of the rule, as stated in the New
York case first above cited, is 'that he who seeks
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aid or advice from a lawyer ought to be altogether free from the dread that his secrets will be uncovered, to the end that he may speak freely and
fully all that is on his mind.' In 19 Ves. 267, Lord
Eldon expressed the thought that one way of preventing an attorney who had changed his relations with his client from testifying against his
client 'would be by striking him off the roll.' The
following quotations in State v. Dawson (Mo.
Sup.) 1 S.W. 829, from the opinions of Lord
Brougham, illustrate the importance and purpose
of the rule: 'The foundation of this rule is not
on account of any particular importance which
the law attributes to the business of the legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford
them protection; but it is out of regard to the
interests of justice, which cannot be upholden,
and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts, and in
matter affecting rights and obligations which
form the subject of all judicial proceedings.'
Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Mylne & K. 98. If such
communications are not protected, no man would
dare consult a professional adviser with a view
to his defense or to the enforcement of his rights,
and no man could safely come into court .either
to obtain redress or to defend himself.' Bolton v.
Liverpool ·Corp., 3 Sim. 467.
"It is evident from an inspection of the record
that the trial court attached much importance to
the question of whether there was an absolute
contract of employment. The trial court conceded,
in fact, that a conditional employment was proved, and that the appearance for Miss Keeler
was upon the employment of the defendant. Undue importance seems to have been attached to
the fact that the attorney had not appeared of
record for the defendant. Greater weight seems
to have been given to the opinion of the attorney
that the conversation with him was not in professional confidence than to all the surrounding circumstances showing that such must have been
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the case. Upon the entire record, if not alone upon
the undisputed facts as testified to by the attorney, it is evident that such relations existed between the attorney and defendant as to make the
communication in question privileged. The conclusion upon all the testimony is irresistible that
a close confidence existed between the parties,
and that the defendant made the statement in
confidence to a person whom he regarded, and
had reason to regard, as his attorney in the case
at bar. In support hereof, also, see Tramway Co.
v. Owens (Colo. Sup.) 36 Pac. 848; Davis v. Morgan (Mont.) 47 Pac. 793; Moore v. Bray, 10 Pa.
519; Benedict v. State (Ohio Sup.) 11 N.E. 125;
Basye v. State (Neb.) 63 N.W. 811; Perry v.
State (Idaho) 38 Pac. 655 (dissenting opinion)."
Defendant in her brief cites In re Young's E·state, 33
Utah 382, 94 P. 731 (1908), in support of her argument
that the privilege under the statute does not apply to Mr.
Patterson. That case, however, is not in point for it involved a will contest and our court, in what is generally
recognized as the universal rule, held that the privilege
did not extend to will contests as such cases come within
the exceptions to the general rule.
Defendant also cites the case of Anderson vs. Thomas,
108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142, (1945). That case is not in
point. Our Supreme Court in the above case, held as
follows:
"We conclude that all of the testimony given
by J. S. Christensen, attorney for Mrs. Thomas,
was properly admitted either (1) as having been
related to communications given in the presence
of third parties; (2) as relating to the execution
of the deed to which he was an attesting witness;
or (3) as not being a communication in the course
of professional employment which M-rs. Thomas
desired to have confidential."
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It is evident from reading the testimony of Mr. Patterson in the case at bar, that none of the three exceptions
quoted above from the case of Anderson vs. Thomas, apply in the instant case. Mr. Patterson received the communications upon which he is attempting to testify in the
course of professional employment and they were not given in the presence of third parties. It m us,t be admitted
that Mr. Patterson was a witness to the will but as this
is not a will contest but an action to recover under a contract, the privilege can not be waived.
Defendant also cites Webb vs. Webb, Utah (1949),
209 P. 2d 201. This case is not in point for the reason that
the court held that the conversation was admissible under
one of the exceptions to the rule whereas in the case at
bar, no contention is made that the conversation between
Mr. Patterson and his client, John Jackson, came within
any of the exceptions to the rule adopted in this state under said Section 104-24-8 (2) of our Judicial Code.
The case of Carey vs. Powell, 32 Wash. 2d 761, 204
P. 2d 193 (1949), is also cited by plaintiff in support of
her contention that Knox Patterson should be permitted
to testify. A reading of this case discloses that the attorney who drew up the will and contract upon which the action for specific performance was based was, according to
his testimony, performing services for the testatrix and
her daughter and that the conversation was had in his
office in the presence of the testatrix, her daughter and
the daughter's husband, and the court held that under
such circumstances, the rule of privilege did not apply as
to the testimony surrounding the execution of the will and
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the contract. In passing, we call to the coui't's attention
that in that case as soon as the case of In re Torstensen' s
E·state, 28 Wash. 2d 837, 184 P. 2d 255, was called to the
attention of the attorney, he withdrew from the case because of professional ethics. There has been no withdrawal of the attorney in the case at bar. In the case at bar,
no one was present at the time of the alleged conversation
between Knox Patterson and his client, John Jackson,
other than Mr. Patterson's law partner, George J. Constantine, who was one of the attesting witnesses to the
will and so plaintiff can not rely upon the authority of
Carey vs. Powell as in that case the conversation was
had in the presence of two other persons and there was
some question as to whether the attorney who drew the
will and contract had been employed by the testatrix,
whose representatives raised the question of privilege.
As this is an action by Lillian Jackson to recover the
sum of $24,500.00 from the estate of John Jackson, the testimony of Knox Patterson to the effect that John Jackson
told him that he had made an oral agreement with Lillian
J·ackson to will to each of their children the sum of $3,500.00
or a total of $24,500.00, would, if permitted to be introduced, defeat the very relationship between attorney and
client for which said Section 104-24-8 (2), Judicial Code,
was enacted, namely, for the purpose of encouraging confidence and preserving inviolate the relationship between
attorney and his client. The statute says "An attorney
cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the client to him, * * in
the course of his professional employment; * * . " (Emphasis ours). In this case neither the consent of John Jack-
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son nor his legal reprsentative was obtained to permit
Knox Patterson to testify as to the conversation which he
had with John Jackson in September of 1920. And we submit that the evidence at the trial conclusively shows that
an attorney-client relationship existed between Patterson
and Jackson at the time Patterson was employed to draw
the will of John Jackson of September 7, 1920. Plaintiff
has failed to show that the testimony of Patterson falls
within any of the recognized exceptions to the general
rule of privileged communications between client and attorney.
The defendant may contend that the conversation did
not take place in the course of professional employment.
John Jackson went to Knox Patterson for the express purpose of having his will prepared by Patterson, who had
been his attorney since 1909. It is hard to conceive that
he went to the office of Patterson and ~Constantine after
his return to Moab in 1920, at the mere suggestion of his
former wife, Lillian Jackson, from whom he had been divorced. The fact that Lillian Jackson had said she wanted
Knox Patterson to draw up the will did not do away with
the relationship of attorney and client created between
Jackson and Patterson and thus cause a waiver of the privilege, for if such relationship is done away with by the
mere suggestion or recommendation of someone as to the
attorney he should consult with, it would lead to the very
destruction of the policy of confidence which the law attempts to preserve and encourage between an attorney and
his client. There is nothing in the records to show that
Lillian Jackson had employed Knox Patterson to represent
her at the time the will was prepared, nor does it disclose
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that she had any conversation whatsoever with Patterson
relative to the preparation of the will in 1920, nor was
Lillian Jackson present at the time the will was prepared.
The voluntary employment of an attorney is not essential
to render confidential communications between attorney
and client becoming privileged. Jayne vs. Bateman, 191
Okla. 272, 129 P. 2d 188 (1942).
No one was present at the time the alleged conversation took place other than John Jackson and Knox Patterson, and George J. Constantine, Mr. Patterson's law partner, who signed the will as a witness and, of course, the
privilege would extend to Mr. Constantine, if he heard the
conversation, by virtue of his being a law partner of Mr.
Patterson.
"A valid contract of partnership may be
made between two or more duly· qualified attorneys, but not between an attorney and a person
not admitted to practice. A firm of law practitioners, as such, are regarded as a single entity
and the general principles of the law of partnership apply to lawyers with the same force that
they do to partnerships engaged in other occupations or professions.
"In the absence of a special agreement, each
member of the firm assumes the duty of giving
to its business all of his time, skill, and ability,
as far as reasonably necessary to the success of
the common enterprise, and, consequently, in the
absence of an express agreement to the contrary
any professional services rendered by a member
of a firm of lawyers will be presumed to be for
the benefit of the firm.
***
"The acts and admissions of one member of
a firm, made in relation to and in the course of
the regular business of the firm, are binding on
the firm. * * * " 7 C.J .S. Page 838 ~ 56.
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A case which is frequently cited with approval as
authority as to what constitutes "professional employment", is Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 20 Colo. 107, 36
P. 848 (1894). This case is cited with approval by our Supreme Court in State vs. Snowden, supra. Justice Elliott,
speaking for the Colorado Supreme Court in that case,
said:
"To constitute professional employment, it
is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. Such a limitation of the rule would
bear hard upon a person involved in legal controversy for the first time, and also upon an attorney
with his first cause. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or
charged for; nor are such matters of any importance except as they may tend to show whether
the attorney was or was not professionally employed. Neither is it material that there was a
suit pending at the time of the consultation, nor
that the attorney consulted did not afterwards
undertake the case about which the consultation
was had. If a person in respect to his business
affairs, or troubles of any kind, consults with an
attorney in his professional capacity, with the
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consu~tation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established, and the communication made by the· client,
or advice given by the attorney, under such circumstances is privileged. An attorney is employed - that is, he is engaged in his professional
capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is
listening to his client's preliminary statement of
his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just
as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause in open
court. It is the consultation between attorney
~nd client which is privileged, and which must
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ever remain so, even though the attorney, after
hearing the preliminary statement, should decline
to be retained further in the cause, or the client,
after hearing the attorney's advice, should decline
to further employ him. The general rule undoubtedly is that a breach of professional relations between attorney and client, whatever may
be the cause, does not of itself remove the seal
of silence from the lips of the attorney in respect
to matters received by him in confidence from
his client. Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89; Hunter v.
Van Bornhorst, 1 Md. 504; Cross v. Riggins, 50
Mo. 335. In this case, it appears that the conductor, Evans, was present at the conversation
between Mr. Mead and the plaintiff. It does not
appear whether he heard or participated in such
conversation, nor is it material whether he did or
did not. The rule excluding the attorney from
testifying did not extend to Evans, and there is
no reason why he might not have been required
to state the conversation, if he heard it. But the
fact that E.vans might have testified did not make
the attorney a competent witness without his
client's consent. The statute contains no such
exceptions, nor was the consultation held in the
presence of opposing parties, or of all parties interested. It does not appear that Evans represented any party in interest, or anybody at all, for
that matter. Rex v. Brewer, 6 ~Car. & P. 363."
At page 28 of plaintiff's brief, appears this statement:
"It will be observed that counsel for the defendant made no objections to the testimony of
the attorney who ·drew the will of 1920 on the
ground of professional ethics, * * * ".
This is true. Defendant did not object at the trial of
this case to the testimony of Mr. Patterson, the attorney
who prepared the will and also the attorney who repres.ented the plaintiff at the trial of this case and who also represents plaintiff on this appeal, on the ground of profes-
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sional ethics. Defendant left the matter of whether Mr.
Patterson should or should not testify in this action on
the grounds of professional ethics entirely up to Mr. Patterson. He chose to testify. As to whether it was proper
for Mr. Patterson to testify, defendant calls the attention
of this court to the discussion of this rna tter in the case
of In re Tortensen's Estate 28 Wash. 2d 837, 184 P. 2d
255, at pages 270 and 271 (1947).
It is also well settled that the termination of the relationship of attorney and client does not affect the protection given by the law to communications made in confidence during existence of the relation, the. rule being
that the privilege, when once attached, continues at least
during the lifetime of the client, unless waived by him. 5
A.L.R. 730, Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, (1894) 20
Colo. 107, 36 P. 848, Hardy vs. Martin, (1907) 150 Cal. 341,
89 P. 111.
In the annotation in 64 A.L.R., pages 192 to 194,
found the following:
"***And where the attorney who drew the
will is requested by the testator to become a subscribing witness thereto, it has been held that
there is an express waiver of the privilege within
statutory provisions, although the waiver does
not permit the attorney to give testimony which
would vary the terms o! the will. * * * But while
a testa tor waives the seal of confidence by requesting his attorney to witness his will, it seems
that he may annul such waiver by revoking the
will, so that the attorney will not thereafter be permitted to testify as to its execution and instructions
given by the testator respecting the will. * * * *"
" * * That, however, no such presumption as
to waiver arises so as to permit the attorney to
testify to facts which vary the terms of the will
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prepared by him, and that in a proceeding to
construe the will, the attorney with whom the
testator consulted concerning it is not competent
to testify concerning a communication made to
him by his client touching his estate, the objects
of his bounty, or the meaning or effect of provisions contained in the will. Knepper v. Knepper
(1921) 103 Ohio St. 529, 134 N.E. 476."
The case at bar does not involve a will contest. Most
of the cases cited by plaintiff involve a will contest. The
will of September 7, 1920, prepared by the law firm of
Patterson and Constantine, was revoked by John Jackson's
will of December 9, 1946. The latter will is the will admitted to probate in Grand county, Utah. It therefore
seems clear from the above authorities., that even if the
case at bar were a will contest case, that Patterson would
not be allowed to testify because the waiver of the confidence which Patterson obtained when he was requested
to witness the will of September 7, 1920, was annulled by
the will of December 9, 1946, because said will revoked
the will of September 7, 1920.
The testator's intention is to be ascertained from the
words of the will. See Section 101-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
There can be no doubt that if Knox Patterson is permitted to testify that it would tend to do injury to the
estate of his former client, John Jackson; and the law, as
we read and understand it, will not permit an attorney to
take advantage of his position to the detriment and injury
of a client. John Jackson by his will of December 9, 1946,
provided for his wife, Sinda Jackson, and all of his children, both those out of his marriage with Lillian J a.ckson
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and Sinda Jackson. If the last desires of John Jackson
can now be set aside through evidence of his former attorney, obtained in the course of professional employment
some 32 years ago, what protection then is left to the public dealing with members of the legal profession? How
did Knox Patterson obtain the alleged facts upon which
he now seeks to testify? Only through his acting for and
being employed as the attorney for John Jackson. On this
subject the Supreme Court of Kansas in Sheehan v. Allen,
67 Kan. 712, 7 4 P. 245 (1903) in holding that two attorneys were incompetent to testify said:
"In this case, however, it is quite clear the
witnesses would not have learned the major portion of the facts which they disclosed, or held the
most important conversations which they repeated on the witness stand, had they not undertaken
to consult with and act for Richard Collins as his
attorneys. This being true, they were incompetent to testify as to such facts. and conversations.
Without these, they were not qualified to speak
upon the question of Richard Collins' sanity; and,
since their observations should have preceded
their opinions (Baughman v. Baughman, 32 Kan.
538, 4 Pac. 1003), their testimony should have
been excluded."
"The absence of the privilege would convert
the attorney habitually and inevitably into a
mere informer for the benefit of the opponent."
8 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed. Sec. 2380a, P. 813.
City and County of San Francisco v. Superior
Court, Cal. (1951), 231 P. 2d 26.
" 'Truth, like. all other good things, may be
loved unwisely, may be pursued too keenly, may
cost too much; and surely the meanness and the
mischief of prying into a man's confidential consulations with his legal adviser, the general evil
of infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness,
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suspicion, and fear into those communications
which must take place, and which, unless in a
condition of perfect security, must take place
uselessly or worse, are too great a price to pay
for truth itself.' Pearse v. Pearse, 1 De G. & Sm.
25." (Cited in Sitton v. Peyree, 117 Or. 107, 24 _
P. 62.)
And so we submit that the trial Judge did not err in
sustaining the defendant's objections to the testimony of
Knox Pa ttterson.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE
EVIDE~N·CE OF:
(C.) THERE WERE NO SEPARATE WRITINGS
RELATING TO THE SAME SUBJECT WHICH COULD
BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER TO BE ADMITTED.
Counsel at page 24 of his brief, argues that separate
writings relating to the same subject should be considered
together. Plaintiff does not call our attention to any such
writings. The only writing signed by John Jackson and
relied upon by plaintiff in this case is· the will of John
Jackson dated September 7, 1920, (Pl. Ex. I), and this
writing is not of the class required to take the case out
of the Statute of Frauds, as declared by the many authorities hereinafter cited. The case of Ayoob vs. Ayoob, 1·68 P.
2d 462, cited by counsel is not in point in this case because,
in the Ayoob ease, there was a written memorandum of
the alleged oral agreement. We desire to cite this court's
attention to the case of In re Edwall's Estate 75 Wash.
391, 134 P. 1041. This case fully discusses the difference
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between agreement and a will, and fully disposes of all of
the arguments made by counsel on this subject.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT MISCONTR.UE THE STATUTE OF FRADDS AND THE CONFLI~CT OF LAWS.
The alleged oral agreement sought to be enforced in
this action \Vas made and entered into April 22, 1918, at
Orland, Glenn County, State of California. At the time
said oral agreement was made, the parties were residents
and citizens of California. Plaintiff is still a resident and
citizen of California. Plaintiff seeks to enforce in the State
of Utah said oral agreement which is invalid and unenforceable in the State of California. The question of conflict of laws dealing with the California Statute of Frauds
is, therefore, one of the questions to be determined. Plaintiff claims that the alleged oral agreement made and entered into in the State of California is not governed by the
California Statute of Frauds. We claim the California
Statute of Frauds is controlling and conclusive, and that
the alleged oral agreement, invalid and unenforceable in
California where made, is also invalid and unenforceable
in the State of Utah, where said invalid agreement is
sought to be enforced.
We pleaded and proved as one of our defenses to the
plaintiff's Complaint, Section 1973, California Code of
Civil Procedure and Section 1624, Civil Code of California.
Section 1973, California Code of Civil Procedure has
been in full force and effect since the year 1907, and reads
as follows:
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"§1973. AGREE·ME.NTS NOT IN WRITING, WHEN INVALID. In the following cases
the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some
note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent.
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement, can not be
received without the writing or secondary evidence
of its contents:
"1. An agreen1ent that by its terms is not
to be performed. within a year from the making
thereof;

"2. A special promise to answer for the
debt, default, or miscarriage of another, except
in the cases provided for in section t,Nenty-seven
hundred and ninety-four .of the Civil Code;
"3. An agreement made upon consideration
of marriage other than a mutual promise to
marry;
"4. An agreement for the sale of goods,
chattels, or things in action, at a price not less
than two hundred dollars, unless the buyer accepts or receives part of such goods and chattels
or the evidences, or some of them, of such things
in action, or pays at the same time .some part of
the purchase-money; but when a sale is made at
auction, an entry by the auctioneer in his salebook, at the time of the sale, of the kind of property sold, the terms of the sale, the price, and. the
names of the purchaser and person on whose account the sale is made, is a sufficient. memorandum;
"5. An agreement for the leasing for a
longer period than one year, or for the sale of
real property, or of an interest therein; and such
agreement, if made by an agent of the party
sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the· agent is in writing, subscribed by
the party sought to be charged;
"6. An agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real
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estate for compensation or a commission;
"7. An agr~ement which by its terms is not
to be performed during the lifetime of the promisor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any
property, or to make any provision for any person
by will."
Section 1624, Civil Code of California, has been in
full force and effect since the year 1905, and reads as follows:
"§1624.. WHAT CONTRACTS MUST BE
IN WRITING. The following contracts are invalid, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by
the party to be charged, or by his agent:
"1. An agreement that by its terms is not
to be performed "\Vithin a year from the making
thereof;
"2. A special promise to ans~wer for the
debt, default, or miscarriage of another, except
in the cases provfded for in section twenty-seven
hundred and ninety-four;
"3. An agreement made upon consideration
of marriage other than a mutual promise to
marry;
"4. An agreement for· the sale of goods,
chattels, or things in action, at a price not less
than two hundred dollars, unless the buyer accepts or receives part of such goods and chattels
or the evidences, or some of them, of such things
in action, or pays at the time some part of the
purchase money; but when ·a sale is made at auction, an entry by the auctioneer in his sale book,
at the time of the sale, of the kind of property
sold, the terms of the sale, the price, and the
names of the purchaser and person on whose account the sale is made, is a sufficient memorandum;
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"5. An agreement for the leasin ~ for a
longer period than one year, or for the sale of real
property, or of an interest therein; and such
agreement, if made by an agent of the party
sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by
the party sought to be charged;
"6. An agreement authorizing or employing
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate
for compensation or a commission;
"7. An agreement which by its terms is not
to be performed during the lifetime of the promisor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any
property, or to make any provision for any person by will."

Both of the above sections of the California Code
were in full force and effect long prior to the time when
the alleged oral agreement above mentioned was entered
into at Orland, Glenn County, State of California, on April
22, 1918.
There is a hopeless conflict in the authorities on this
question. We believe, however, that the weight of authority and the best reasoned cases support the general rule
that the construction and validity of a contract are governed by the law of the place where made, and that this
includes the formality. or necessity of a written memorandum required by the Statute of Frauds.
II Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, Section 198, pages 514
and 515, reads in part as follows:
"D." STATUTE· OF FRAUD'S
"§198. Generally.-The authorities are in
· hopeless conflict as to the extent to which the
principle that contracts valid or invalid by their
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proper law are valid or invalid elsewhere applies
to contracts unenforceable by reason. of the statute of frauds of the jurisdiction in which they
are made and to be performed. In the application
of the general rule that a contract invalid where
made is unenforceable in another jurisdiction,
though it would have been valid if there made, it
has been held that an oral promise or contract,
unenforceable in the jurisdiction where made,
cannot be enforced in another jurisdiction though
it would have been valid if there made. It has also
been held that if the contract sought to be enforced was valid where made, it may be enforced
in the jurisdiction of the forum though it would
have been unenforceable if made in the latter jurisdiction. If the contract is unenforceable both by
the statute of the state where it was made, which
is proved, and by the statute of the state of the
forum, there is no question that it will not be enforced in the latter jurisdiction."
II Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, Section 200, pages 518
and 519, reads in part as follows.:

"
" - - - - - The modern trend supports the doctrine that rejects, so far as the conflict of laws
is concerned, the distinction based on the procedural or substantive form of the provisions of
the statute and regards them for such purpose as
essentially substantive, irrespective of their
form. Upon the assumption that the statute of
frauds or a particular provision thereof relates
to substance and not to procedure, the question
arises whether the contract is governed in this
respect by the law of the place where it was made
or by the law of the place of performance, if the
two differ. It seems to be held, in a majority of
cases, that a contract, valid by the law of the
place where it was made, will be enforced, although contrary to the statute of frauds of. the
place of performance. Conversely to the general
rule, it has been held that a contract in violation
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of the statute of frauds of the place where it was
made will not be enforced, although valid according to the law of the place of performance. - - - "
In the case of Lams vs. F. H. Smith Company, 36 Del.
477 ; 178 A. 651 ; 105 A. L. R. 646, reading from page 648,
the court states :
"Most of the American decisions discussing
the nature and character of the Statute of
Frauds, and especially in connection with the conflict of laws, may generally be divided into three
groups:
"(1) those that adopt the distinction laid
down in Leroux v. Brown and hold the Statute
remedial or procedural;
"(2) those that repudiate the distinction
yet still hold the Statute remedial; and
"(3) those that repudiate the distinction
and hold the Statute is substantive."
The Court then continues and at page 649 of 105 A.
L. R.. states :
"In the third group holding that the Statute
of Frauds should be construed as substantive and
not procedural are many well reasoned cases supported by articles by leading educators. Halloran
v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141, 162
N. W. 1082, L.R.A. 1917E, 777; Cochran v. Ward,
5 Ind. App. 89, 29 N. E. 795, 31 N. E:. 581, 51 Am.
St. Rep. 229; Matson v. Bauman, 139 Minn. 296,
166 N. W. 343; Miller v. Wilson, 146 Ill. 523, 34
N. E. 1111, 37 Am. St. Rep. 186; Goodrich, COnflict of Laws, §88; Restatement, Conflict of
Laws, §334, "Statute of Frauds and the Conflict
of Laws," 32 Yale Law Journal 311. See, also, as
to Pennsylvania Act (33PS §1 et seq.) being substantive, Franklin Sugar· Co. v. Martin-Nelly Co.,
94 W. Va. 504, 119 S. E. 473; Franklin Sugar R.e-
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fining Co. v. Holstein I-Iarvey's Sons (D. C.) 275
F. 622; Franklin Sugar Co. v. \Villiam D. Mullen
Co. (D. C.) 7 F. (2d) 470.''
"The principle that the construction and validity of a contract are governed by the lavv of the
place where it is made applies to the formality or
necessity of a written memorandum required by
the Statute of Frauds. Lams. v. F. H. Smith Co.,
105 A.L.R. 646, 36 Del. 477, 178 A. 651, (Annotated)."
It certainly was not the intent of the California Legislature in passing the above sections of the California Statute that its citizens (and both the plaintiff and the deceased, John Jackson, were at the time the alleged agreement
was entered into citizens of the State of California, and the
Plaintiff is still a citizen of c·alifornia) be harassed upon
the contract and be faced by oral testimony if sued in the
courts of another state. The Delaware Court speaking on
this subject in the case of Lam·s vs. Smith, 105 A.L.R. 646,
reading from pages 649 and 650, says:
"The Delaware Statute of Frauds requiring an
agreement not to be performed within a year to be
evidenced by a memorandum in writing is primarily for the benefit of the citizens of Delarawe. It
was the agreement or contracts of Delawareans
which were mainly sought to be protected from
the future uncertainties of oral testimony and the
Legislature was not merely laying down a rule of
evidence for the Courts. If the necessity of writing
be procedural then while the lack of writing would
prevent the enforcement of the contract in the
Courts of Delaware yet the Delaware citizen would
still be liable to be harassed upon the contract and
to be faced by oral testimony if sued in the ·Courts
of another State, the Statute of which had been
held to be substantive. On the other hand, if the
necessity of writing be construed as one of the
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formalities of the contract, then the absence of
the writing would make the contract-not voidbut unenforceable in the Courts of Delaware, and,
under principle of comity and conflict of laws, unenforceable outside of the State and insure to· the
citizens for whose benefit the Act was passed the
full measure of protection. Restatement, Conflict
of Laws § 334."
Speaking on this subject, the California Court in the
case O'Brien vs. O'Bt:ien, 241 Pac. 861 (Cal.), reading from
page 864, says:
"It must be taken as the settled law in this
state that by the amendment of 1905, adding subdivision 7 to section 1624 of the Civil Code, and by
the corresponding provision of subdivision 7 of
section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure as
amended in 1907, 'an agreement - - - to devise or
bequeath any property, or to make any provision
for any person by will' is invalid unless the same
or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing
and su'bscribed by the party to be charged or his
agent. - - "The reason prompting the amendment of
1905 is aptly stated by the Code Commission in his
note appended to Section 1624 as follows:
"'The change consists in the addition of subdivision 7. The cases in which it (is) sought to
establish by parol evidence alleged agreements to
provide for a person by will are becoming so numerous as to warrant the assumption that the reasons inducing the original enactment of the statute of frauds apply vvith especial force to agreements of this class and that they ought to be
brought within· that statute.'
"Since that amendment, the effect of the new
subdivison as applied to numerous and varying
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states of facts has been before the courts, but
where has it been decided, . so far as vve are
vised, that the amendment should not be given
same force and effect as other provisions of
statute of frauds. - - - "

noadthe
the

There is an exhaustive annotation of the cases on this
point immediately following the recorded case of Lams
vs. F. H. Smith Company, 36 Del. 477, 178 A. 651; 105 A.
L. R. 646. In analyzing the matters under discussion in this
case the annotator in 105 A.L.R., reading from page 661,
states:
"In other words, the adoption either of the
view that the essential character of the statute
as substantive or procedural depends upon its
form, or of the view that the statute, regardless
of its form, is essentially procedural, leaves always
open the possibility that the breath of life may be
breathed into a contract that was stillborn tested
by the law of the place where it was made, if the
defendant is unwary enough to be caught, or to
permit his property to be caught, in a jurisdiction
whose statute is satisfied (a statute which presumably was entirely beyond the range of reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of
their transaction) ; and, upon the other hand,
leaves open the possibility of practically nullifying
a contract valid and enforceable tested by the law
of the place where it was made, if the party desiring to escape its burdens takes himself and his
property to, and keeps them in, another j urisdiction whose statute is not satisfied. Both of these
possibilities are avoided by the adoption of the
view that the Statute of Frauds, regardless of its
form, is essentially substantive, unless in a particular instance the court regards it as contrary to
the public policy of the forum to enforce a contract that is valid tested by the law of the place
where it was made, but which does not comply with
the requirements of the local Statute of Frauds.
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These realistic considerations against the procedural view of the statute as regards conflict of laws
are forcibly presented.by the opinion in the LAMS
CASE (Del.) (reported herewith) ante, 646." 105
A.L.R., page 661.
In the case of Johnson v.

Allen, 158 Pac.

(2d) 134

(Utah), reading from page 138, the court states:
"In making the argument that Idaho law
should govern because the listing contract covered Idaho lands, the defendant fails to note the true
nature of the contract involved. It does not purport
to transfer an interest in Idaho land; rather it is
a contract of employment. See Toomy v. Dunphy,
86 Cal. 639, 25 P. 130; Kennedy v. Merickel, 8 Cal.
App. 378, 97 P. 81; Callaway v. Prettyman, 218 Pa.
293, 67 A. 418. Its validity is to be determined by
the law of the place where the contract was made·.
Callaway v. Prettyman, supra; Detroit & Cleveland
Nav. Co. v. Hade, 106 Ohio St. 464, 140 N.E. 180;
Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112, 33 S.
Ct. 69, 57 L. Ed. 146; Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass.
211, 45 N.E. 737, 36 L.R.A. 771, 57 Am. St. Rep.
442; Story, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 262; Beale, Conflicts of Laws, Vol. II, pp. 1181, 1191.
"In Callaway v. Prettyman, supra, the listing
contract was made in Pennsylvania to sell real estate situated in New Jersey. New Jersey law required the listing contract to be in writing and under New Jersey law the contract would have apparently been invaliid. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that 'the validity of the contract as affected by the statute of frauds is c:ontrolled by
the law of this state, and not by that of New Jersey, and Callaway's contract of employment, made
in this city, was valid, as the law of the place of
making the contract governs as to the formalities.' (218 Pa. 293, 67 A. 419). ·We conclude that
the law of the place of the making governs the
validity of the contract."
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There is also a further annotation on this subject at
161 A.L.R. 820.
The oral contract was made and concluded in the State
of California.
The fact that John Jackson later at
Moab, Utah, made a Will makes no difference to the situation in this case. He could have gone to any state of the
Union and made a Will. A Will is ambulatory and can be
revoked at any time by the testator. The Will contains
nothing but a simple bequest; no terms of the alleged oral
agreement are set forth in the Will; the Will is," therefore, no evidence whatsoever of the oral agreement sufficient to remove said alleged oral agreement from the operation of the Statute of Frauds. See the many cases cited
in our brief.
The presumption in the absence of any indic·ation to
the contrary will always be that a contract is to be performed at the Place where it is made. 11 Am. Jur. Conflicts of
Laws ~ 117 Page 402.
E·ven if the alleged oral agreement was to be performed in some other state, which we do not admit, the better
considered cases from the point of view of principle indicate that the Statute of Frauds of the state in which the
contract is made and entered into controls as to its validity. 105 A.L.R. 675.
Plaintiff claims that the writtin agreement of April
22, 1918, is against public policy. · That is immaterial in
this case. The plaintiff is not seeking to enforce or to set
aside said written agreem·ent. Plaintiff pleaded and made
said written agreement a part of her Complaint. She receivSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ed approximately $28,689.00 as the consideration for said
agreement. Said agreement cannot now be set aside on
the ground that it is against public policy. The matter of
public policy does not enter into this case whatsoever.
· · The only matter that enters into this agreement is: Was
there a valid, binding, oral agreement that can be enforced
in the face of the California Statute of Frauds?
We therefore conclude that the California Statute of
Frauds is applicable and that the alleged oral agreement
is not enforceable in Utah.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT E.RR ON THE QUESTION OF
PLAINTIFF'S PLE:A OF ESTOPPE·L.
We proved at the trial of this cas.e by the citation of
many California authorities construing the above code
sections that the California Courts have consistently held
that an oral agreement to devise or bequeath any property
or to make provision for any person by will is invalid and
unenforceable.
In the case of Bogan vs. Wiley, decided January 14,
1946, 164 Pac. (2d) 912, reading from page 914, the California court says:
"The code sections declare that an oral contract to devise or bequeath property by will is invalid. Since their enactment our decisions have
consistently held that such contracts are unenforceable."
C'iting cases.
In the case of Brought vs. Howard, 249 Pacific 76 (Ariz.), the Arizona Court, under a statute identical with the California statute above
quoted, approves and sustains the rulings of the
California Courts.
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The State of Massachusetts also has a similar provision and sustains the rulings of the California and Arizona courts. The cases from Massachusetts sustaining said proposition are cited in
the Howard case above mentioned.
We believe that from what we have said we have conclusively shown that an oral agreement to bequeath property by will is invalid and unenforceable under the above sections of the California Code. Plaintiff, however, contends
that there has been a sufficient performance of the oral
agreement to take her case out of the Statute of Frauds
and that the Defendant is estopped from setting up the
statute because :
1. John Jackson delivered to her the Benefit Certificate, Woodmen of the World, dated the 24th day of February, 1906, · (Pl. Ex J).
2. Because plaintiff pursuant to said alleged oral
agreement reared, supported and educated her children and
. that she, therefore, fully performed her part of the oral
agreement.
3. That the execution of the will of September 7, 1920,
by John Jackson (Pl. Ex. I) whereby he bequeathed $3,500.00 to each of his children constituted a part performance of the alleged oral agreement.
4. That said will is a sufficient writing evidencing
said alleged oral agreement to take the ease out of the
above sections of the California Code.
Needless to say, we do not agree with plaintiff's contentions above set forth. We contend that there has not
been a sufficient or any performance to take the plaintiff's
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case out of the statute; and that there is no writing evidencing said alleged oral agreement and that plaintiff must
fail on all of her contentions.
In the case of Stevenson vs.. Pantaleone (Cal.) 21 Pacific 2d 703, reading from pages 704, 705 and 706, the
Court states :
"The vital question to be determined is this:
Conceding that the excluded evidence established
an agreement, it is equally clear therefrom that
the agreement was oral. Such being the case,
was there, as claimed by the appellant, such a performance of its terms as would raise the bar of
the statute of frauds?
"One of the objections upon which the offered testimony was excluded was based upon subdivision 3 of section 1624 of the Civil Code, which
section, so far as rna terial, reads as follows : 'The
following contracts are invalid, unless the same,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or
by his agent: - - - 3. An agreement made upon
consideration of marriage other than a mutual
promise to marry. - - -'
"The objection was also predicated on section
1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and subdivision 3 thereof, which is in substance the same
as section 1624, supra. Although there was no contract in writing,. nor any note or memorandum
thereof in writing subscribed by the parties, it
is claimed by appellant that the rejected evidence
discloses that the contract had been fully executed by him, and partly by her, and therefore the
statute of frauds has no application here. This
contention is stated in the appellant's opening
brief as follows: 'Both parties to said agreement
performed some portion thereof. Plaintiff performed each and every provision thereof on his
part to be performed, and the only provision that
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was not performed was the promise on the part of
said Edith M. Hendrickson to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries in her policy of insurance
from defendants to that of plaintiff, and this action is the result thereof.' The excluded evidence
supports the following conclusions: That they
agreed to get married ; that they agreed to change
the beneficiaries from those named in the policies, in favor of each other; that the premiums on
the policies were to be paid from their community earnings; that no premiums were paid on the
policy of insurance issued on the life of plaintiff's wife on account of sickness overtaking bet,
and, while she was sick the premiums were taken
care of by a provision in the policy of insurance;
that plaintiff kept up the premiums on the policies on his life; that, but for such antenuptial
agreement with her and its anticipated fulfillment, the plaintiff would not have consummated
the marriage and performed the agreement ori
his part; that they were married; that the plaintiff thereafter changed the beneficiary named in
the insurance policies carried on his life to his
wife; that his wife did not change the beneficiaries named in her policy to the name of the plaintiff; that she had stated to her beneficiaries
that she did not intend to make a change; that she
left her policy in the custody of the plaintiff, and
he knew that she had not made the change.
"Do the foregoing facts constitute part performance sufficient to take the case out of the
statute of frauds? If so, then the court erred in
excluding the testimony ; if not, then the order of
exclusion was properly made, for there can be no
question that the contract was one required to be
in writing.
"In Hughes v. Hughes, 49 Cal. App. 206, 193
P. 144, the plea was made that the defendant, in
consideration of the plaintiff marrying him,
agreed to deed plaintiff certain property ; make a
will bequeathing to her all of his property at his
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age was consumated, and the will was made, but
defendant refused to convey the property. The
above case is authority for the propositions that
marriage does not take the case out of the statute
of frauds; that the execution of the will was not
sufficient part p~erformance, and the oral contract
could not be enforced because not executed in conformity with subdivision 3 of section 1624 of the
Civil Code. Also that a court of equity will not enforce an oral antenuptial agreement to convey real
and personal property after the marriage, unless
it is made to appear that the promisor, by some
fraud or deceit, prevented the oral agreement being reduced to writing.
"In Peek v. Peek, 77 Cal. 106, 19 P. 227, 1
L.R.A. 185, 11 Am. St. Rep. 244, it is held that
marriage is not of itself part performanc·e of a
parol contract to convey real property in consideration of marriage, sufficient to take the case out
of the statute of frauds.
"In Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mas·s. 408, 4 Am.
Rep. 573, which is cited with approval in Hughes
v. Hughes, supra, is involved the principal applicable to the case at bar. The facts alle·ged in the
complaint in that action, to which a demurrer was
sustained by the court, was to the effect that the
plaintiff and one Nancy Gould agreed by prarol that
each of them should make a will in the other's
favor, and give and devise thereby all her property,
both real and personal, to the <)ther, and that
neither of them was to make any different will at
any time, or to dispose of her property in any manner different therefrom. Afterwards Nancy Gould
made another will in favor of other p·arties, and
died. The court said : 'There has been no part performance which a1nounts to anything. The plaintiff says she made a will devising her property to
Nancy. But such an instrument was ambulatory,
and might have been revoked by various acts, or by
implication of law from subsequent changes in the
condition or circumstances of the testator. - - - -
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The plaintiff's property is still, as it has always
been, in her own hands, and subject to her own
control.' See, also, In re Edwall's Estate, 75 Wash.
391, 13--1 P. 1041; McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77
Wash. 138, 137 P. 479, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 461.
"In the case at bar the right to change the
beneficiary named in the several insurance policies
at all times rested in the insured, and, as said in
the case last cited, concerning the power to make
a will, the right to change the will was am hula tor J,
and the same right exists to change the bene-ficiary in a policy of insurance, and not constitute a
sufficient part performance to take the· case out of
the statute of frauds.
"In Browne, Stat. Fr. §§452-454; Williams v.
Morris, 95 U. S. 444, 24 L. Ed. 360, the rule is laid
down that it is not enoug·h that the act of part performance is evidence of some agreement; but it
must be unequivocal and satisfactory evidence of
the particular agreement itself. To the same effect
is Swash v. Sharpstein, 14 Wash. 42-6, 44 P. 862,
32 L.R.A. 796; Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal. App. 167,
182 P. 333; 58 C.J., p. 994, §190; 12 Cal. Jur. p.
898, §60.
"In Henry v. Henry, 27 Ohio St. 121; Finch
v. Finch, 10 Ohio St. 501, it is held that, whe·re a
wife, in consideration of marriage, orally agreed
to convey real property to her husband, the marriage of the parties, moving onto the land and making valuable improvements thereon, were not sufficient acts of part performance to take the case out
of the statute of frauds; such acts being as much referable to his character as a husband as under the
oral antenuptial agreement. In Trout v. Ogilvie, 41
Cal. App. 167-172, 182 P. 333, 335, it is said: To
take a contract out of the operation of the statute
of frauds, however, the acts relied upon must be
unequivocally referable to the contract. Acts which,
though in truth done in performance of a contract,
admit of an explanation without sup·posing a conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tract, are not, in general, such acts of part performance as will take the case out of the operation
of the statute. 36 Cyc. 645. The acts relied upon
must clearly appear to have been done in pursuance of the contract, and to result from the contract and not from some other relation.' (S.ee cases
there cited.)
"In Baker v. Bouchard, 12~ Cal. App. 708, 10
P. (2d) 468, the decision of the court, so far as material to the case at bar, is epitomized in the syllabus as follows: 'In an action to enforce a trust in
real property alleged to have arisen by virtue of
an oral agreement between plaintiff· and defendant's intestate whereby the decedent agreed, in
consideration of plaintiff taking up her residence
in decedent's home and providing and caring for
him during his declining years, that he would make
a will devising to her the real property in question,
which oral agreement plaintiff claimed she fully
performed, an attempted will by decedent devising
said property to plaintiff which did not refer to
the alleged oral agreement a.nd which was void for
want of compliance with statutory provisions governing wills, did not constitute a sufficient memorandum of the alleged oral agreement to comply
with the requirement of section 1624 of the Civil
Code and section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such action the fact that plaintiff fully
performed her part of the alleged oral agreement
did not take the contract out of the operation of
the statute of frauds.
"In O'Brien v. O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577-586, 241
P. 861, it is held that neither subsequent marriage
nor the execution of a will pursuant to an oral antenuptial agreement to make a will is such part performance as will relieve the contract from the operation of the statute of frauds.
"In the case before us, the change of the beneficiary by the plaintiff may be attributable to his
character of husband, and nothing else. So far as
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the wife is concerned, she did no act toward performance.
"In Luders v. Security Trust, etc., Bank, 121
Cal. App. 408, 9 P. (2d) 271, 272, in an action to
enforce a trust based on an alleged oral agreement,
it is said: 'Nor does this case fall within the rule
that the statute of frauds cannot be invoked in case of a completed oral contract
(Schult v. Noble, 77 Cal. 79, 19 P. 182; Colon v. Tosetti, 14 Cal. App. 693, 113 P. 365, 366),
for the contract now sued upon was not completed.
The reason that the contract is now in court is because the decedent did not perform his part of the
alleged agreement. - - - - '
"From the foregoing review of the evidence
offered by the plaintiff, it is clear that Edith M.
Hendrickson did nothing that could be construed
as an act of part performance of the oral ante-nuptial agreement; even the act of marriage did not
not constitute part performance. The only act performed by plaintiff which could be attributable to
the said agreement was the change in the beneficiary in the policies of insurance issued on his life,
and, under the above-cited authorities., such act
was insufficient to raise the bar of the· statute.
Such being the case, the ruling of the court sustaining the objections to the offered evidence was
correct, because the agreement was not in writing
and no facts were shown sufficient to support its
enforcement as an executed oral agreement. The
other questions raised, therefore, become imma ..
terial."
The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona in the case
of Brought vs. Howard, 249 Pacific 76, reading from pages
79 and 80, states:
"'Jonathan R. Brought's will in favor of plaintiff does not on its face purport to have been made
in pursuance of any contract to make it. It merely
indicates an intention to make a testamentary gift
to the plaintiff. It is not a memorandum of any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

82
contract to will or devise. As is said in Zellner v.
Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 193 P. 84:
" 'The pre-eminent qualification of a memorandum under the statute of frauds is 'that it must
contain the essential terms of the contract, expressed with such a degree of certainty that it may
be understood without recourse to parol evidence
to show the intention of the parties.' 5 Browne on
Statute of Frauds, sec. 371. Accordingly, it has
been held in this state that an undelivered deed
cannot be regarded as a sufficient memorandum of
an oral agreement for the sale of land the·rein described when the deed is silent as to the terms of
the alleged agreement and merely conveys the land
from one party to another. Swain v. Burnette, 89
Cal. 564, 570, 26 P. 1093. In other jurisdictions the
same reasoning has been applied to a will, for some
reason ineffective upon the death of the testator,
which makes no mention of the terms of the contract in pursuance of which it is alleged to have
been executed. Allen v. Bromberg, 163 Ala. 620, 50
So. 884; McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 Wash.
138, 137 P. 479, Ann Cas. 1915A, 461. A potential
factor in furtherance of fraud would be engendered
were a will containing· a simple bequest permitted
to operate as evidence of a binding contract to
make such a bequest. It must therefore be held
that there is no written memorandum of the agreement here in suit.'

"See, also, Watkins v. Watkins, supra; Hale v.
Hale, 90 Va. 728, 19 S. E. 739; In re Edwall's Estate, 75 Wash. 391, 134 P. 1041; Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh, 120 Wash. 487, 207 P. ·657.
"For the above reasons we conclude the plaintiff has failed to show herself entitled to the equitable relief sought, and the court did not err in so
deciding."
In the California case of Baker vs. Bouchard, 10 Pacific
2d 468, reading from page 469, the Court states:
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Hln connection with this instrument, it is to
be observed that it contains no reference to the
alleged oral agTeement.- --

- - -- "Section 1624 of the Civil Code and section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly
provide that an agreement to devise or bequeath
property or to make provision for any person by
will is invalid unless the conrtact or some note or
memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed
by the party charged or by his agent. It is not contended that there was any written memorandum
of the alleged agreement other than the invalid
~ill. This instrument contained a simple devise of
the real property in question to appellant without
reference to any agreement in respect thereto. It
does not, therefore, constitute a sufficient memorandum of the alleged oral agreement to comply
with the requirement of the above-mentioned statutes. Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 193 P. 84.
In the case of Freeman, et al., vs. R~iver Farms Co. of
California, et al., 44 Pacific 2d 422, reading from page 423,
the Court states:
"Respondents contend that appellant is estopped to set up the statute of frauds as a defense,
but we have found no authority to support respondents' contention under the facts presented
here. Respondents take the position that as they
had performed the work under their contr.act with
the levee district, appellant is estopped from relying upon the statute. We believe this position to be
untenable. Assuming, as de respondents that under
their alleged agreement with appellant, respondents agreed to do said work for the levee district
(which assumption appears to be contrary to the
fact), performance by one party of an alleged
agreement does not always remove the case from
the operation of the statute and ordinarily only
such performance as is specified in the statute itself is sufficient for that purpose, O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577, 241 P. 861; Baker v.
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Bouchard, 122 Cal. App. 708, 10 P. (2d) 468, Forbes
vs. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal. App. 781, 282 P.
528; Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal. App. 167, 182 P. 333;
Booth v. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., 21 Cal. App. 427,
131 P. 1062. 'Furthermo·re, it is clear that, in order
to take a contract out of the operation of the statute of frauds, the acts relied upon as establishing
part performance must be unequivocally referable
to the contract. If such acts, though in truth done in
performance of a contract, admit of an explanation without supposing a contract, they do .not
generally constitute such part performance as to
remove the case from the operation of the statute.'
Baker v. Bouchard, supra, 122 Cal. App. page 711,
10 P. (2d) 468, 469; see, also, O'Brien v. O'Brien,
supra; Trout v. Ogilvie, supra."
In the California case of Luders v. Security Trust &
Savings Bank, et al, 9 Pacific (2d) 271, reading from pages
271, 272 and 273, the Court states:
"In June 1923, deceased executed a will in
which she bequeathed her property to app~llant
'for her faithful service to me.' Appellant seeks
to bring this case without the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624) by reason of
this will, and also by her partial performance of
the terms of the contract with deceased. She maintains that the will was a sufficient note or memorandum in writing of the contract to take it out
of the statute.
"These two arguments of appellant have been
resolved against her by the decisions of the Supreme and Appellate Courts of this state. These
decisions were reviewed by this court in the recent case of Cazaurang v. Carrey, 4 P. (2d) 259,
261, where it was said: 'We think no such full permance is here shown, as takes this agreement or
these agreements out of the statute. Hughes v.
Hughes, 49 Cal. App. 206, 193 P. 144, 145; Zellner
v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 193 P. 84, 86; O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577, 241 P. 861, 864. In the case
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of Hughes v. Hughes, the court said: 'The subsequent making of defendant's will, in favor of the
plaintiff, following the marriage, was not such part
performance of the oral agreement to make such
vvill as to take the alleged contract out of the statute of frauds.' In Zellner v. Wassman, the court
said: 'Agreements to leave property by will must
be reduced to writing or evidenced by some written
note or memorandum; for, by virtue of the :1_905
Amendment to section 1624 of the Civil Code, they
are within the purvie\v of the statute of frauds.
It is admitted that the agreement of the son to
leave $5,000 by will herein sued upon was not reduced to writing, and that no written note or memorandum thereof was made unless the will executed by deceased, a copy of which was attached
to the complaint, fulfills the requirements of the
statute in that respect. The will in question contained a simple bequest of $5,000 to plaintiff,
without reference to any agreement in respect
thereto. The pre-eminent qualification of a memorandum under the statute of frauds is 'that it inust
contain the essential terms of the contract, expressed with such a degree of certainty that it may
be understood without recourse to parol evidence
to show the intention of the parties.' 5 Browne on
Statute of Frauds, § 371. Accordingly, it has been
held in this state that an undelivered deed cannot
be regarded as a sufficient memorandum of an
oral agreement for the sale of land thereindes.cribed when the deed is silent as to the terms of the
alleged agreement and merely conveys the land
from one party to another. S.wain v. Burnette, 89
Cal. 564, 570, 26 P. 1093. In other jurisdictions
the same reasoning has been applied to a will, for
some reason ineffective upon the death of the testator, which makes no mention of the terms. of
the. contract in pursuance of which it is alleged
to have been executed. Allen v. Bromberg, 163 Ala.
620, 50 So. 884; McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77
Wash. 138, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 461, 137 P. 479. A
potential factor in furtherance of fraud would be
engendered were a will containing a simple bequest
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permitted to operate as evidence of a binding contract to make such a bequest. It must therefore be
held that there is no written memorandum of the
agreement here in suit. Nor does this case fall
within the rule that the statute of frauds cannot
be invoked in case of a completed oral contract
(Schultz v. Noble, 77 Cal. 79, 19 P. 182; Colon v.
Tosetti, 14 Cal. App. 693, 113 P. 865, 366), for the
contract now sued upon was not completed. The
reason that the contract is now in court is because
the decedent did not perform his part of the alleged agreement by causing to be in existence at the
time of his death a will bequeathing $5,000 to
plaintiff. The mere execution of a will was not a
performance of the contract.'
The Court concludes at page 273 as follows:
"The will which deceased executed in 1923 did
not 'contain the essential terms of the contract, expressed with such a degree of certainty that it may
be understood without recourse to parol evidence
to show the intention of the parties,' as required
in the case of Zellner v. Wassman, supra, and was
not a sufficient note or memorandum of the contract to bring this case without the provisions of
the statute of frauds."
In the case of Brooks vs. Whitman, 10 P,ac. (2d) 1007,
Calif. reading from page 1009, the Court states:
"The making of a will is absolutely no evidence of an agreement to make a will. As was said
in Monson vs. Monsen, 174 Cal. 97, 102, 162 Pac. 90,
92 : 'The making of a will has no tendency to show
that there is a contractual obligation to make such
will.' See also Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal 80, 86,
193 Pac. 84, 87, wherein it is said, 'a potential factor in furtherance of fraud would be engendered
were a will containing a simple bequest permitted
to operate as evidence of a binding contract to
make such a bequest. And in the same category
and for the same reasons would fall statements
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made by a party as to the fact of his having made
a will in favor of one claiming as in the present
case.''
In the case of DeMattos vs. McGovern, 77 Pac. (2d) 522
(Cal), reading from pages 523 and 524, the Court states:
I

"The main difference between this case and
those which have gone before is that the appellant
herein insists that notwithstanding his failure to
pursue the reg-ular remedy '\Vhich the law has given
him, he should be permitted to invoke the equity
jurisdiction to give him the relief which the law
denies. On the theory that because he continued in
the employment of the deceased in reliance upon
the alleged agreement that agreement was partly
executed he argues that the case is taken out of
the statute of frauds. The premise is not sound.
The services were rendered under a separate contract of employment. The same is to be said about
the representation that a will had already been
made in accordance .with such an agreement. The
execution of the will is not part performance of
the alleged contract. Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal. 2d
469, 47 4, 45 P. 2d 198. The right to revoke a will
lies with the testator until the time of his death,
and, unless limited by an agreement in writing,
equity cannot intervene. N otten v. Mensing, supra,
3 Cal. 2d 469, page 473, 45 P. 2d 198.
"The case is controlled by these settled principles: Under section 1624 of the Civil Code and
section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an
agreement to make a will, or to leave property by
deed or will is invalid unless in writing. An agreement not to revoke a will already made is, in effect,
the sam·e as an agreement to make a will, and must
also be in writing. Caza urang v. Carrey, 117 Cal.
App. 511, 517, 4 P. 2d 259; Notten v. Mensing, 3
Cal. 2d 469, 473, 45 P. 2d 198.
"An oral agreement to make a will or to leave
property by de·ed in compensation for services rendered, or to be rendered, is not enforceable as such.
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The remedy is one in quantum meruit for
the value of the services rendered. Zellner
v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 84, 87, 193 P. 84;
Morrison v. Land, supra, 169 Cal. 580, pages 586,
590, 147 P. 259; Ruble v. Richardson, 188 Cal. 150,
154, 204 P. 572; Lauritsen v. Goldsmith, 99 Cal.
App. 671, 675, 279 P. 168; Burr v. Floyd, 137 Cal.
App. 692, 696, 31 P. 2d 402.
"E·quity follows the law and, when the law determines the rights of the respective parties, a
court of equity is without power to decree relief
which the law denies. 10 R.C.L., p. 382; Magniac
v. Thomson, 15 How. 281, 299, 302, 14 L. Ed. 696;
Federal Land Bank v. Wilmarth, 218 Iowa 339,
252 N.W. 507, 513, 94 A.L.R.. 1338.
" - - - There is, however, the complete harmony in the cases holding to the rule that, where
the oral contract to compensate by will was made
in consideration of services rendered or to be rendered, the promissee's rem·edy is one at law to recover the reasonable value of his services. It is
equally well settled that before the promisee may
maintain an action for that purpose he must file a
claim against the estate. Morrison v. Land, supra,
169 Cal. 580, page 585, 147 P. 259. - - - "
The plaintiff in the case at bar is not seeking compensation for services rendered nor for money expended by her
in rearing, supporting and educating her children, which
she claims she did under an oral agre-ement. Her claim is
not based on quantum meruit. At the pre-trial of this case
on March 23, 1951, plaintiff eliminated all matters relating
to quantum meruit or the reasonable value of services rendered and all matters relating to quantum meruit were
stricken from the Complaint (R. page 93). Plaintiff filed
no claim whatsoever against the estate on the basis of
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quantum meruit. We believe that the cas·es cited by us conclusively demonstrate that plaintiff is not. entitled to recover in this action; quantum me~ruit is entirely out of the
case, no claim was filed based on quantum meruit, and she
has stated no facts that warrant any recovery whatsoever
in equity.
Counsel, at page 45 of his brief, complains about the
deceased revoking his "Contract Will," presumably the will
made by John Jackson on September 7, 1920 (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1).
The right to revoke a will lies with the testator until
the time of his death and unless limited by an agreement
in writing, equity cannot intervene. Notten v. Mensing, 45
Pac. (2d) 198 (Cal.) and other cases above cited.
57 Am. J ur., § 458, page 322, reads in part as follows:
"§ 458. Right, Power, and Capa,~ity to Revoke.
Revocability is an essential characteristic of a will.
Except where the testator subsequently becomes
incompetent, he retains the power of revocation as
long as he lives, and this is true regardless of whether he retains possession of the will or delivers
possession to the beneficiary or to a third pe-rson.
Wills are revocable to such an unlimited degree
that even an express provision in a will providing
that it is not revocable in no wise prevents the will
from being actually revocable.

"A will executed pursuant to a contract to
make a will is revocable and is not entitled to probate if a revoking will is executed; however, the
testator cannot relieve himself of the obligation of
the contract by revoking the will. In other words,
a will is revocable but a con tract to make a will is
not. - - - "
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See also, O'Hara vs. O'Hara, annotated at 163 A.L.R.
1444.
We especially call the court's attention to the case of
In re Edwall's Estate 75 Wash. 391, 134 P. 1041 for an excellent treatise of a number of questions involved in this
action-we will cite only that portion of the syllabus of said
case at page 1041 which reads as follows:
"A husband and wife, each of whom owned
real property, executed deeds simultaneously by
which each conveyed his or her real property to
the other and delivered them in escrow under an
agreement that the deed of the one first dying
should then be recorded. They subsequently executed wills simultaneously, which were attested
by the same witnesses, to take the place of such
deeds, by which each gave his or her real and personal property to the other. Neither the deeds nor
the wills on their face made any reference to an
alleged oral agreement that the wills should be irrevocable except by agreement or upon notice. Held,
that such oral agreement was void and unenforceable under the statute of frauds; the deeds and
wills not constituting sufficient evidence thereof
in .writing."
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that under the foregoing argument and authorities the trial court did not err in its decision. The judgment appealed from should therefore be
Affirmed.
MITCHE,LL MELICH,
Moab, Utah.
RUGGERI AND GIBSON,
First National Bank Building,
Price, Utah.
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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